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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
Readmission agreements have been used for a long time as a key means of combating 
illegal immigration, whether at bilateral, intergovernmental or EU level. 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has acquired the 
power to give its own consent to the EU readmission agreement (Art 218 TFEU).  
There can be no question that the independent exercise of this function depends on the 
Parliament's ability to be kept informed during the negotiation process to acquire accurate 
data and knowledge about the actual rationale for readmission agreements, their 
configuration, their utility, and their implications for human rights observance.  
Moreover, it is the argument of this study that EU readmission agreements cannot be 
isolated from a predominantly bilateral system of cooperation on readmission in which most 
Member States are currently involved. Paying attention to this bilateral system is key to 
understanding the real challenges facing the development of a common readmission policy 
based on the fundamental rights principles that the Union seeks to advance in its external 
action.  
AIM 
This study sets out to explain the drivers shaping cooperative patterns on the readmission 
of unauthorised third-country nationals, whether at bilateral or EU level. It lays emphasis 
on the existence of a predominant bilateral readmission system in which EU agreements 
are inextricably embedded. As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
reinforced political control of the European Parliament calls for an analysis of this system 
and of its implications for human rights observance. 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
  The TFEU reaffirmed, in a more explicit and unquestionable manner, the shared 
competence between the Union and the Member States in the field of readmission.  
 The shared competence between the Union and the Member States should be driven 
by the principle of sincere cooperation. The respect of this principle presupposes, 
however, three conditions: 1) effective procedures of notification, 2) 
monitoring capacities, and 3) an optimal convergence of priorities and 
contingencies between the Member States and the Union. 
 An optimal degree of convergence of priorities and contingencies between the Union 
and the Member States has not been reached so far. 
 The mandate of the Commission consists in brokering an agreement, based on 
standard reciprocal obligations, procedures and protection rules. The EU readmission 
agreement is subsequently implemented at a bilateral level between each Member 
State and the third country concerned. 
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 EU readmission agreements constitute a tiny share of the overall number of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission. EU readmission agreements cannot be isolated 
from a broader readmission system based on resilient patterns of bilateral 
cooperation in the field of readmission. 
 Member States continue to retain their right to conclude bilateral agreements with 
third countries. Patterns of cooperation have changed dramatically since the entry 
into force of the ToA. 
 Readmission agreements are rarely an end in itself but rather one of the many 
ways to consolidate a broader bilateral cooperative framework, including other 
strategic (and perhaps more crucial) policy areas such as security, energy, trade, 
and counter-terrorism. 
 France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have been at the forefront of a 
new wave of agreements linked to readmission. 
 Flexibility and the drive for operability have acquired mounting importance in 
the practice of readmission over the last fifteen years or so. Non-standard 
agreements are gaining momentum. Among others, they stem from the perceptible 
empowerment of some source countries as a result of their proactive 
involvement in the reinforced police control of the EU external borders. 
 The prioritisation of operable means of implementation might dilute 
international norms and standards that had been viewed as being sound and secure. 
The drive for operability rests on a subtle denial whereby the enforceability of 
universal norms and standards on human rights is weakened without necessarily 
ignoring or denying their existence. 
 Mobility partnerships are not EU readmission agreements, neither in their 
rationale nor in their form. However, they are no less arrangements aimed at 
addressing an array of issues, including readmission. 
 There is no harmonized approach to voluntary return at an EU level. Some EU 
Member States have established in the framework of their cooperation on 
readmission a link with Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes. 
 Available statistical data allow operability to be calculated, not its implications in 
terms of human rights observance. They address law-enforcement decisions as 
applied to the readmission of unauthorised aliens but not their concrete effects on 
the fate of readmitted persons. 
 Private business concerns and large security corporations have been increasingly 
mobilized, arguably to minimize the costs (and visibility) of removals and to 
maximize their operability 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Recommendation 1: The European Parliament should request the Commission to 
carry out a thorough and regularly updated inventory of all the bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission (whether standard or not) concluded by each EU Member 
State, at global level.  
 Recommendation 2: The European Parliament should ask the Commission to report 
precisely on the monitoring of EU readmission agreements, during the implementing 
phase. Monitoring mechanisms should be reinforced in order to check whether 
readmission procedures comply with the terms of an EU readmission agreement, 
particularly in situations when no implementing protocol has been signed between a 
given Member State and a third country. 
 Recommendation 3: The full and independent exercise of the EP’s power to give its  
consent to readmission agreements will necessarily depend on the extent to which 
the European Parliament will have access to information relating to the negotiation 
phase as well as the implementation phase of EU readmission agreements. This 
might lend support to the argument that representatives of the European Parliament 
should be involved in Joint Readmission Committees (JRCs).  
 Recommendation 4: In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, and 
with due respect to the Treaties, Member States should inform the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament about the extent to which grafting readmission 
on to other strategic policy areas is consistent with the “fulfilment of their 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union” (Art. 4 (3), TEU).  
 Recommendation 5: The European Parliament should ask the European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) to carry out a thorough study on the practice of 
“premature returns” and on its impact on the respect for fundamental rights and 
refugee protection standards. The study will apply to all the third countries with 
which the EU is intensifying its dialogue in the field of migration management, 
including those with which EU readmission agreements are being negotiated or have 
been concluded. 
 Recommendation 6: The European Parliament should request the Commission to 
report clearly on the type of dialogue on migration management that is to be 
intensified. The Commission should report on how the respect for fundamental rights 
and refugee standards is concretely translated in the geographical priorities of the 
EU external action.   
 Recommendation 7: Given the full incorporation of the Charter in the Treaties, the 
European Parliament should call for an updated list of binding criteria that have to 
be respected to identify third countries with which new EU readmission agreements 
can be negotiated. The need for an effective asylum system in the third country, 
based on the obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, constitutes one key 
criterion that monitors the consequences of the drive for operability. 
 Recommendation 8: A comprehensive assessment of AVR programmes on the safety 
and conditions of all “voluntary returnees” in third countries of return should be 
undertaken by the European Parliament. This assessment is of paramount 
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importance to lay emphasis on the extent to which AVR programmes may or may 
not have external human rights implications, after return to a third country. 
 Recommendation 9: The European Parliament should call on the Commission to 
adopt an evaluation process of EU readmission agreements that fully reflects their 
manifold implications, not only in terms of operability, but also in terms of respect 
for the Union’s fundamental values. The FRA should be mobilised to identify robust 
and measurable indicators allowing the fate of readmitted persons to be evaluated.  
 Recommendation 10: The European Parliament should call on the Commission to 
foresee the possibility of assessing a sample of bilateral readmission agreements. 
Given the predominance of a bilateral readmission system in which most EU Member 
States are involved, this initiative would shed light on the rationales, configuration 
and implications for human rights observance of bilateral patterns of cooperation on 
readmission. 
 Recommendation 11: The European Parliament should undertake a thorough 
examination of the outsourcing of migration control functions to private contractors 
in all the EU Member States. This monitoring is of paramount importance to assess 
the actual magnitude and rationale for outsourcing to private security companies as 
well as its implications for public accountability and for the observance of 
unauthorised aliens’ fundamental rights, particularly those who are offered an order 
to leave. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Readmission agreements have been used for a long time as a key means of combating 
illegal immigration, whether at bilateral, intergovernmental or EU level. 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament has acquired 
enhanced power to give its consent to the EU readmission agreements (Art. 218 TFEU). 
There can be no question that the independent exercise of these functions, depends on the 
Parliament ability to be kept better informed during the negotiation process, to acquire 
accurate data and knowledge about the actual rationale for readmission agreements, their 
configuration, their utility and their implications for human rights observance. 
Among many other priorities, the Stockholm programme foresees the need for an 
evaluation process of EU readmission agreements that are being implemented and 
negotiated, with a view to ensuring that “the objectives of the EU’s efforts on readmission 
should add value and increase the efficiency of return policies, including existing bilateral 
agreements and practices” (European Council 2009: 67). 
It is the argument of this study that EU readmission agreements cannot be isolated from a 
predominantly bilateral system of cooperation on readmission in which most Member States 
are currently involved. Paying attention to this dominant bilateral system is key to 
understanding the real challenges facing the development of a common EU readmission 
policy based on the fundamental rights principles1 that the Union seeks to advance in its 
external action.  
This study sets out to explore the domain where the cooperation on readmission is located 
while focusing on the existence of broader patterns of interaction that may impact on the 
ways in which the EU has (re)configured its cooperation. It also highlights the gaps that 
may exist, under some circumstances, between reciprocal obligations and effectiveness, as 
well as between the drive for operability and the respect for fundamental rights.  
In sum, the effective and independent exercise of a reinforced political control on decision-
making calls for an analysis of how and why the “European readmission system” has 
materialized so far and which major forces have driven policy options, at bilateral and EU 
levels. 
Premises 
Just like deportation, readmission is a form of expulsion if we assume that “the word 
‘expulsion’ is commonly used to describe that exercise of state power which secures the 
removal, either ‘voluntarily,’ under threat of forcible removal, or forcibly, of an alien from 
the territory of a state” (Goodwin-Gill 1978, p. 201, cited in Walters 2002). Readmission 
has become part and parcel of the immigration control systems consolidated by countries of 
origin, transit, and destination. Technically, readmission as an administrative procedure 
requires cooperation at the bilateral level with the country to which the readmitted or 
                                                 
*  The author wishes to express his gratitude to the anonymous respondents for their time and availability 
during interviews. Also, special thanks go to Sergio Carrera, Michele Cavinato, Alejandro Eggenschwiler, 
Nicola Hargreaves, Mercedes Jimenez, Neva Ozturk, Adriano Silvestri, Piyasiri Wickramasekara and Tamar 
Zurabishvili.  
1  See Art. 21(1) TEU. 
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removed persons are to be relocated. In substance, readmission permeates both domestic 
and foreign affairs. Practically, it is aimed at the swift removal of aliens who are viewed as 
being unauthorized. These include not only the nationals of the contracting parties to an 
agreement, but also third-country nationals who transited through the territory of the 
contracting parties. 
The practice of readmission, viewed as a form of expulsion is, in its various forms, perhaps 
as old as the exercise, whether soft or violent, of state sovereignty and interventionism 
designed to regulate the entry and exit of aliens. In the early 20th century, the principle of 
readmission, based on the obligation under customary international law to take back one’s 
own nationals who are found in unlawful conditions, was expressed in various bilateral 
agreements in Western Europe, even if, as Kay Hailbronner has stressed, “representatives 
of some states voiced reservations about an absolute duty to reaccept [their nationals]” 
(Hailbronner, 1997, p. 7). Additionally, Aristide Zolberg shows that, as early as the 19th 
century, in the United States, “[readmission] did not constitute a punishment but was 
merely an administrative device for returning unwelcome and undesirable aliens to their 
own countries”.2 This assumption holds true when it comes to explaining readmission as a 
form of control exerted by national law-enforcement agencies or administrations to 
categorize aliens and citizens alike.  
However, as shown in this study addressed to the European Parliament, today’s 
cooperation on readmission involves more than an “absolute duty” under customary 
international law or a mere “administrative device”.  
1. RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS, PRINCIPLES AND 
COMPETENCE 
Readmission agreements are concluded to facilitate the removal of “persons who do not or 
no longer fulfil the conditions of entry to, presence in or residence in the requesting state”. 
(European Commission, 2002, p. 26). As mentioned before, there exists under customary 
international law an obligation to readmit one’s own nationals. Bilateral agreements aimed 
at the readmission of the nationals of the contracting parties are concluded to facilitate this 
obligation.3 In other words, they should not be a sine qua non when it comes to dealing 
specifically with the nationals of the contracting parties. In practice, however, various 
European Union Member States have concluded bilateral agreements addressing exclusively 
the readmission of the nationals of the contracting parties. These include, for instance, the 
agreements concluded between Germany and Vietnam in 1995, Italy and Algeria in 2000, 
or more recently between the United Kingdom and Algeria in 2006. Arguably, such 
agreements reaffirm an obligation which is recognised under customary international law. 
By contrast, the readmission of third-country nationals, i.e., nationals other than those of 
the contracting parties and stateless persons, does not constitute an obligation under 
customary international law (Roig and Huddleston 2007; Charles 2007; Noll 2005). The 
explicit reference to the readmission of both national and third-country nationals broadens 
the cooperative scope of bilateral readmission agreements while arguably justifying their 
rationale and reciprocal obligations. All the EU readmission agreements that have been 
                                                 
2  Aristide Zolberg (2006, pp. 225-226) refers to “deportation”, which is mainly used in the parlance of the US 
administration. 
3  "The obligation for states to readmit their citizens is clear in international law. Article 13 of the 1948 UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines the right to return to one’s own country, the corollary of 
which must be the obligation of the state to allow one to do so. Readmission agreements do not establish 
the state’s obligation to readmit its citizens, but merely facilitate this process” (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 
p. 364), see also Noll (2005).  
 13 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
concluded so far apply to both nationals and third-country nationals. The readmission of 
non-nationals has not always constituted a major obstacle in the formal conclusion of EU 
readmission agreements. Some agreements, particularly those concluded with Russia, 
Ukraine and Albania, foresee the possibility of applying a two- or three-year transition 
period allowing the signatory third country to improve its structural and institutional 
capacities to manage the readmission of third-country nationals. Arguably, this transition 
period was negotiated with a view to addressing “capacity-building [needs] although 
improvements [have turned out to] be minimal” (Roig and Huddleston, 2007, p. 373). 
Conversely, other agreements did not at all refer to this transition period as applied to the 
readmission of non-nationals (e.g., the EU readmission agreements concluded with Serbia, 
Sri Lanka, and Montenegro). To understand such differences or discrepancies, we need to 
place the conclusion of readmission agreements into a broader framework of interaction 
and power relations that shape the intensity of the quid pro quo. This point is extensively 
developed in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 
1.1 EU readmission agreements 
Since the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), which empowered the European 
Commission to negotiate and conclude EU readmission agreements with third countries, 
eighteen negotiating mandates were granted by the Council. Today, negotiations at EU 
level have led to the entry of into force eleven readmission agreements (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, FYROM, Hong Kong, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sri 
Lanka, and Ukraine) and to the signature of an agreement with Pakistan.4  
To orient its own strategy, the European Commission has adopted “a standard approach in 
negotiating readmission with third countries [by seeking] to achieve final texts that have as 
many common features as possible” (Trauner and Kruse, 2008, p. 24). This means that a 
kind of model has been used and readapted to each bargaining process specifying the 
reciprocal obligations that each contracting party commits to respecting.  
 
Table 1. List of EU readmission agreements 
Third country Mandate Date of signature Entry into force 
Albania November 2002 14 April 2005 1 May 2006 
Algeria November 2002   
Bosnia and Herzegovina November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 
Cape Verde June 2009   
China* November 2002   
FYROM November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 
Georgia September 2008   
Hong Kong SAR April 2001 27 November 2002 1 March 2004 
Macao April 2001 13 October 2003 1 June 2004 
Moldova December 2006 10 October 2007 1 January 2008 
                                                 
4  Decisions concerning the conclusion of European readmission agreements with some listed third countries 
are available online. For third countries in the Western Balkans see:  
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/western_balkans/l14562_en.htm.  
 For third countries in Eastern Europe (except Russia), see:  
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_im
migration/l14163_en.htm.  
 For Hong Kong and Macao, see:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/immigration/immigration_illegal_en.htm   
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Montenegro November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 
Morocco September 2000   
Pakistan September 2000 26 October 2009  
Russia September 2000 25 May 2006 1 June 2007 
Serbia November 2006 18 September 2007 1 January 2008 
Sri Lanka September 2000 4 June 2004 1 May 2005 
Turkey November 2002   
Ukraine June 2002 18 June 2007 1 January 2008 
*  China signed an Approved Destination Status (ADS) Agreement in 2004. This accord is not an EU 
readmission agreement. Rather, it is a memorandum of understanding facilitating the entry of Chinese 
tourists into EU Member States. Article 5 of the memorandum includes a series of provisions requiring 
China to take back its nationals who overstay and to cooperate on their readmission. Formal negotiations 
on an EU readmission agreement have not started yet. 
This model or specimen was recommended in November 1994 by the Council of the 
European Union to the Member States in their bilateral and multilateral negotiations with 
third countries on the conclusion of readmission agreements5. Among others, the thirteen 
articles of the document mentioned: 
- The obligation of the requested contracting party, upon application by the 
requesting party, to issue, without delay, the travel documents needed to expel 
their own nationals; 
- The obligation to readmit third-country nationals, without any formality, who do not 
or no longer meet the conditions for entry or residence on the territory of the 
contracting parties; 
- The time limits for replying to a readmission request. These were fixed to a 
maximum of 15 days; 
- The time limits for taking charge of persons whose readmission has been agreed. 
These were fixed to a maximum of one month; 
- The time limits for submitting an application for readmission. A readmission 
obligation might lapse if the application is submitted more than a year after a 
contracting party has noted the illegal entry or stay of a third-country national on its 
territory; 
- The fact that the costs of transportation up to the border of the requested party will 
be borne by the requesting party; 
- The creation of a committee of experts (i.e., a joint readmission committee); 
- The provisions of the agreement will comply with the obligations of the contracting 
parties arising, among others, from the 1951 refugee convention and its 1967 
protocol, international conventions on extradition and transit, the 1950 Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
                                                 
5  OJ C 274, 19 September 1996, pp. 20-24. 
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- The possibility for the contracting parties of suspending or terminating the 
agreement on such “important grounds” as public health, state security or public 
order.  
Having recommended a model of agreement on readmission, the next step for the Council 
of the European Union consisted of recommending the “guiding principles”6 for the drafting 
of protocols aimed at implementing the readmission agreements. These principles were 
proposed in July 1995. They included procedures of readmission at the entry ports (so-
called simplified or accelerated procedures) and the maximum time limit (two days) for 
expelling an unauthorised person apprehended in a border area. Beyond that time limit, the 
so-called normal procedure applies and a formal readmission application must be sent in 
writing to the requested party. “Answers [to readmission requests] should be compulsory” 
and replied to within 15 days. The guiding principles also listed an array of means for 
identifying and presuming the nationality of persons to be readmitted. An exhaustive list of 
means of proofs or presumptions of identity was presented; it ranged from identity cards 
(even if provisional or temporary), consular registration cards, to statements by witnesses 
and the language of the person to be readmitted.  
The authorities of the requesting state should provide evidence of the date of entry of 
third-country nationals and stateless persons. Also they should demonstrate that they 
directly entered the territory of the requesting state from the territory of the requested 
state. Under the accelerated procedure (i.e., at border-crossing points), the statement of a 
border officer suffices to provide evidence and readmit the person within 48 hours. Under 
the normal procedure, evidence should be provided on the basis of a commonly agreed list 
of documents, e.g., valid visa or residence authorisation delivered by the requested state. 
Otherwise, there is a common (and exhaustive) list of documents that are annexed to the 
agreement and that are considered as means of evidence to initiate investigations (on the 
part of the authorities of the requested state) prior to the issuance of travel documents and 
to the ensuing readmission of stateless persons and third-country nationals. Among others, 
such documents include: statements by bona fide witnesses and border officers, bills of any 
kind and named tickets showing the itinerary of the person on the territory of the 
requested state, statement of the person concerned, to mention just a few examples. 
The reference to the abovementioned recommended model of readmission agreement and 
their related implementing protocols is important because these documents clearly 
reflected the attempt of the EU to consolidate a Common asylum and migration policy 
which was later enshrined in the conclusions of the 1999 Tampere special meeting of the 
European Council. At the same time, they implicitly translated the awareness of the EU 
institutions that Member States’ bilateral patterns of cooperation on readmission with third 
countries differed noticeably. Finally, they foretold the reinforced powers of the Community 
in the field of readmission which materialised through Art. 63(3)(b) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC): 
“The Council […] shall […] adopt […] measures on immigration policy within the 
following areas: […] illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of 
illegal residents”. 
1.2 A reaffirmed shared competence 
Art. 63(3)(b) of the TEC marked a watershed in the recognition of a Community 
competence regarding measures aimed at addressing illegal migration and illegal 
                                                 
6  OJ C 274, 19 September 1996, pp. 25-33. 
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residence; readmission (though not explicitly mentioned in the TEC) was considered as 
being part and parcel of these measures. Nils Coleman (2009), in his comprehensive study 
on Community readmission agreements, clearly explained that, following the adoption of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), the issue of competence was subjected to controversy 
between the Member States and the European Commission. The Commission “claimed 
exclusive Community competence to negotiate and conclude readmission agreements” 
(Coleman, 2009, p. 75) whereas the Member States and the Council viewed Art. 63(3)(b) 
of the TEC as the expression of a shared competence. In May 1999, the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council meeting set out to solve the controversy, as Coleman clarified: 
“The Council made sure to link Community readmission agreements to the Community 
objective of repatriation, sufficiently to safeguard a legal basis in Article 63(3)(b), but 
not to the degree of resulting in exclusive competence. In the political assessment of 
the Council, the link between Community readmission agreements and the objectives 
of repatriation of unauthorised immigrants was in general not considered 
‘indissoluble’, and the competence to conclude readmission agreements therefore 
shared. The Member States hereby retained the right to conclude agreements with 
third countries on a bilateral basis, implicitly accepting […] the risk of distortions 
within the internal market in light of the free movement of persons” (Coleman, 2009, 
pp. 78-79).  
Today, there can be no question that Member States have continued to retain their right to 
conclude bilateral agreements with third countries, given the expanding cobweb of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission in which most Member States are currently involved. 
However, as analysed in the next chapters, the patterns of cooperation have changed 
dramatically since the entry into force of the ToA, rendering the drive for europeanization 
much complicated (Roots, 2009). 
Admittedly, the need for Community competence in the field of illegal migration and illegal 
residence, including readmission, constitutes a logical step given the overriding objective to 
consolidate a Common asylum and migration policy. Concomitantly, Member States 
presumably expected that the EU could exert, through this (shared) competence, a 
stronger leverage on third countries “to cope with their readmission obligations towards the 
Union and the Member States” [italics added].7  
Whereas the ToA established the Community competence, the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon (TL) in December 2009 introduced several amendments that, to some extent, 
reaffirmed in a more explicit and unquestionable manner the shared competence of the 
Union in the field of readmission. Art. 3 and 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) respectively list the areas of exclusive and shared competences. 
‘Freedom, security and justice’ (FSJ) constitutes an area of shared competence in Art. 4 
(TFEU) and readmission logically belongs to this area. Art. 79, which amended Art. 63(3) of 
the TEC, clarifies in points 2(c) and 3 the competence of the Union in the field of 
readmission: 
– […] The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas: 
– […] illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and 
repatriation of persons residing without authorisation;  
                                                 
7  As stated in the conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council held in Tampere on 15-16 
October 1999 (see Point 26) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm.  
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– […]The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission 
to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not 
or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the 
territory of one of the Member States. 
1.3 Sincere cooperation 
Admittedly, the clear existence of a Union competence in the above areas is congruent with 
the reinforced integration of migration issues in the EU external relations with third 
countries. It also reflects the commitment to consolidating the Global Approach to Migration 
(GAM) where the cooperation on readmission constitutes a key element. The attainment of 
this major objective continues to be based on the principle of “sincere cooperation” 
between the Union and the Member States. Art. 4(3) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Union (TEU) – which replaced Art. 10 of the TEC – stipulates that the Member 
States shall “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives”. Just like former Art. 10 of the TEC, Art. 4(3) of the TEU allows Member States 
to share their competence in the field of readmission “only regarding third countries with 
which the Commission is not or not yet in the process of establishing readmission relations 
on behalf of the [Union]”, to rephrase Nils Coleman (2009, p. 83).  
Art. 2(2) of the TFEU seems to confirm this interpretation when stating that: 
The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its 
competence. 
In other words, Member States will not exercise their competence on readmission when the 
Union is negotiating or has concluded an EU readmission agreement with a given third 
country. This does not mean, however, that Member States will not exercise their 
competence on readmission as a whole. It is often mistakenly understood that the mandate 
granted to the European Commission by the Council to negotiate and conclude an EU 
readmission agreement would also cover the implementation phase of the agreement. To 
be clear, the mandate of the Commission consists in brokering an agreement, based on 
standard reciprocal obligations, procedures and protection rules. The EU readmission 
agreement is subsequently implemented at a bilateral level between each Member State 
and the concerned third country.8 Protocol 25 annexed to the TEU and the TFEU clearly 
stipulates that the Union’s competence is limited in its scope:  
When the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of 
competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and 
therefore does not cover the whole area. 
In theory, the existence of a shared competence between the Union and the Member States 
in the field of readmission should not be problematic, as long as it is driven by the principle 
of sincere cooperation, as mentioned before, and that effective mechanisms allow the 
                                                 
8  This point was made clear in April 2006 by Karel Kovanda, Special Representative for Readmission Policies 
at DG Relex, during an interview made by Euroasylum: “EC readmission policies and agreements fall under 
the external dimension. They set out reciprocal obligations binding the Community on the one hand and the 
partner country on the other hand. But once an agreement is negotiated, the Community responsibility is 
over. Its day-to-day implementation, the actual decision about sending a person back and the actual 
operation it involves – all this is entirely within the competence of our Member States.” 
http://www.eurasylum.org/Portal/April2006.htm  
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infringement of this principle to be first detected and then corrected. It is worth recalling 
that, in the scope of an EU readmission agreement concluded with a third country, Member 
States have to comply with the general principles of EU law (legal certainty, legitimate 
expectations, effective remedies, proportionality and fundamental rights). In practice, 
however, this presupposes three preconditions.  
1.3.1  Procedures of notifications 
The first one refers to notification procedures. The Member States would need to notify, on 
a regular basis, the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament their planned 
negotiations or talks on readmission with third countries. They would also have to notify 
their current bilateral agreements linked to readmission. As explained in the subsequent 
chapters, this notification procedure would necessarily address the variety of cooperative 
patterns linked to readmission (e.g., standard readmission agreements, exchanges of 
letters, pacts, memoranda of understanding, framework agreements) that several Member 
States have concluded, over the last fifteen years or so, to ensure the operability of their 
cooperation with third countries. 
 Recommendation 1: The European Parliament should request the Commission to 
carry out a thorough and regularly updated inventory of all the bilateral agreements 
linked to readmission (whether standard or not) concluded by each EU Member 
State, at global level.  
1.3.2  Monitoring capacities 
The second pertains to monitoring capacities. Monitoring mechanisms should be 
strengthened to understand how EU readmission agreements are bilaterally translated by 
each Member State during the implementation process. To be sure, each EU readmission 
agreement foresees the creation of a Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) comprising 
representatives of the European Commission (EC), assisted by experts from the Member 
States, and representatives of the third country. Actually, the JRC is in charge of promoting 
regular exchanges among the individual Member States and the third country on issues 
regarding the application and interpretation of the EU agreement. Member States may 
conclude bilateral implementing protocols stating, among others, the competent authorities 
that receive and process readmission applications in accordance with the time limits set out 
in the agreement, the border crossing points, the role of escorting officers, the means of 
identification, the need to notify the JRC of the bilateral implementing protocols and any 
ensuing amendments for their entry into force. This would mean that the JRC possesses, to 
some extent, the tools to monitor whether the Member States and the third country abide 
by the terms of the EU readmission agreement.  
However, experience has shown that Member States may implement the EU readmission 
agreements concluded with some third countries without necessarily having a bilateral 
implementing protocol. For instance, at the time of writing (August 2010), most 
readmission applications addressed to Moldova in 2008 and 2009, in the framework of its 
EU readmission agreement, originated in France and the Czech Republic, which do not have 
any implementing protocol with Moldova.9 Similarly, most of the readmission applications 
addressed to Serbia in 2009 came from Germany and Sweden, which have no 
                                                 
9  At the time of writing (August 2010), Moldova has signed implementing protocols with Estonia, Romania, 
and Slovakia. It is currently negotiating implementing protocols with all the other EU Member States. 
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implementing protocol.10 The same applies to the Republic of Macedonia which has no 
implementing protocol with Germany whereas most of the readmission applications 
addressed to the Republic of Macedonia in 2008 and 2009 came from this EU Member 
State.11 Arguably, the main factor explaining the absence of bilateral implementing 
protocols may lie in the existence of the bilateral readmission agreements that all the EU 
Member States cited above had concluded before the European Commission was mandated 
to negotiate an EU readmission agreement with Moldova, the Republic of Macedonia and 
Serbia respectively. The existence of such bilateral agreements on readmission may have 
been viewed by the contracting parties as a kind of established modus operandi on which 
they could capitalise to implement the EU readmission agreement, even without an 
implementing protocol or the prospect of signing one.  
A standard provision mentioned in almost all the EU readmission agreements states that 
they take precedence over any bilateral treaties or arrangements on readmission “in so far 
as the provisions of the latter are incompatible with those of this Agreement [i.e., the EU 
readmission agreement].” It has to be said that the issue of compatibility of existing 
bilateral arrangements or agreements on readmission (whether standard or not) has not 
been dealt with consistently in all EU readmission agreements (Coleman, 2009). Moreover, 
it is argued that “according to this provision [on compatibility], the Member States may 
continue to apply earlier concluded agreements or arrangements with the same [third] 
country insofar as these are compatible with the Community [or EU] agreement” (Coleman, 
2009, p. 108).  
Arguably, this assumption continues to arouse controversy. EU officials would certainly 
argue against it whereas representatives from some EU Member States would probably 
interpret the wording of the compatibility provision as being respectful of pre-existing 
bilateral efforts to cooperate on readmission with third countries and that implementation is 
and remains bilateral.12 Beyond this controversy, the capacity to assess the 
abovementioned compatibility of bilateral treaties would necessarily imply that the JRC and 
the European Commission, by the same token, should be informed about the scope and 
provisions of all the existing bilateral arrangements or agreements on readmission that a 
given Member State has concluded with a third country involved in an EU readmission 
agreement. Adding value to the action of the Member States would logically require the 
knowledge and understanding of existing bilateral patterns of cooperation on readmission. 
Additionally, this would also imply that the Commission has the capacity to monitor, in the 
framework of JRCs, Member States’ modalities of implementation. In this respect, when 
asked whether the Commission has the effective capacity to monitor the concrete 
implementation of EU readmission agreements, an official from the European Commission 
replied: 
We do have already the tools. The problem is how you strike a balance between on-
going negotiations, for which you are in need to have the support of your Member 
States, and how [EU readmission] agreements are [actually] implemented […] What 
you don’t want to do is to make people’s life more difficult than anything else. We 
                                                 
10  So far, Serbia has signed implementing protocols with Slovenia, Italy, France, Hungary and more recently 
with Austria, the Benelux and Malta. Negotiations with Estonia, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia are underway. 
11  To date, the Republic of Macedonia has signed bilateral implementing protocols with Estonia and Austria. 
Negotiations with Germany and The Netherlands are being finalized at the time of writing (August 2010). 
Negotiations with Slovakia, Italy and Hungary are still underway. Draft protocols have been sent to all the 
EU Member States on the initiative of Macedonia. 
12  With reference to interpretation, an interviewed Spanish official made clear that EU readmission 
agreements supersede bilateral agreements. However, “there is a clause in the EU readmission agreements 
RA, which states that established bilateral practices can be kept if they work properly.” Anonymous 
interview made on 16 July 2010. 
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are not doing policy in order to make policy. We are doing it because we are 
convinced we can bring added value and help the Member States. Now, we don’t 
want to render the whole process more difficult. Now, having said this, there are 
some rules that need to be respected and those rules will be reminded if they are 
not respected.13 
Additionally, monitoring capacities are also needed to ensure that a readmitted person does 
not face any risk of torture or ill-treatment in a country of final destination (either a third 
country of transit or a country of origin). This refers specifically to persons who are 
readmitted on transit through the territory of a cooperative third country with which a 
readmission agreement has been concluded. Transit operations are, however, possible if 
readmitted persons are not subjected to ill-treatment, torture and criminal sanctions in the 
requested third-country and if the latter considers that the transit of the readmitted 
persons does not pose any threat to public order and domestic security (Balzacq 2008, p. 
23). Despite the existence of these principles and protection standards, transit operations 
and the ways in which they are monitored remain problematic, for a requested third 
country might then transfer the readmitted persons to another third country where their 
rights and safety might be violated (Balzacq 2008, p. 30; Charles 2007, p. 7). To counter 
this risk (also known as “domino effect”) when implementing an EU readmission 
agreement, the representatives of the third country taking part in joint readmission 
committees (JRCs) should regularly inform all the other members of the JRCs about the 
existence of and rationale for agreements or arrangements linked to readmission concluded 
with other third countries. Such a commitment is essential to foresee the potential impact 
of readmission on the effective respect of the non-refoulement principle and on the safety 
of readmitted persons during the implementing phase of the agreement and to adopt 
measures accordingly.  
There can be no question that monitoring mechanisms are key to understanding how the 
terms of an EU readmission agreement have been concretely translated, if not 
reconfigured, in the course of the implementation. This refers not only to procedures per 
se, but also to the respect of the fundamental rights of the persons to be readmitted with 
which each Member State must comply, since the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (henceforth the Charter) has become part of the core legislation of the EU. 
It also refers to the possibility of denouncing practices, adopted by a Member State or by a 
third country, that do not comply with their respective obligations and responsibilities 
arising from international law (non-affection clause), particularly regarding the non-
refoulement principle enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and the respect of the 
rights of migrants. It has to be said that obligations and responsibilities arising from 
international law have not been addressed consistently in the EU readmission agreements. 
The wording of the clause of non-affection contained in each EU readmission agreement 
differs quite substantially between two ensembles of agreements. For instance, Florian 
Trauner and Imke Kruse (2008) note that the agreement concluded in 2004 with Hong 
Kong SAR did not refer explicitly to human rights and refugee protection standards. The 
same observation applies to the agreements concluded with Macao and Sri Lanka. 
Conversely, the second ensemble pertains to the EU readmission agreements concluded 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, and 
Ukraine. In this second ensemble, the EU readmission agreements contain a more 
extensive and explicit reference to international human rights instruments and refugee 
protection standards. The explicit reference to such internationally recognised standards in 
the second ensemble of EU readmission agreements did not only stem from “repeated 
                                                 
13  Anonymous interview conducted with a member of the European Commission, 19 July 2010. 
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pressure” (Trauner and Kruse, 2008, p. 22) from the European Parliament and human 
rights organisations which demanded a clear reference to human rights and refugee law in 
non-affection clauses. It also resulted from the fact that such an explicit reference would 
not have substantially weakened the negotiating power of the EU, nor would it have 
hampered the negotiation process, above all when considering that the third countries 
involved in the abovementioned second ensemble are party to the Geneva Convention.  
Monitoring mechanisms are also essential to respond to changed circumstances in the third 
country which might severely impair the respect of internationally recognised human rights 
standards. It is worth recalling that readmission agreements are often concluded with third 
countries having unstable or fragile regimes (e.g., Sri Lanka, Pakistan) that need to be 
closely monitored in order to assess their effective capacity to comply with the terms and 
obligations contained in the agreement. Lack of compliance with human rights standards 
and with their responsibilities under international law objectively constitutes a serious 
ground to suspend, on a temporary basis, the application of the agreement.  
Another key aspect linked with monitoring lies in effective data protection. All EU 
readmission agreements do detail the principles that need to be applied in order to fairly 
and lawfully collect process and communicate personal data or any information needed to 
identify the person to be transferred. It is, however, of paramount importance to clearly lay 
down the common rules that need to be respected by the contracting parties when it comes 
to protecting personal data. Whereas Member States are bound by the 1995 Directive on 
Data Protection (95/46/EC) and by their national legislations, third countries are bound by 
their domestic laws which arguably might not necessarily offer the same level of protection. 
The creation of an independent supervisory body, formally recognised by the contracting 
parties when concluding the agreement, would respond to the need for effective data 
protection. 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TL), such monitoring mechanisms, as 
applied to effective data protection, lawful readmission practices, changed circumstances 
and the “domino effect”, may be reinforced during the negotiating and implementing 
phases.  
 
 Recommendation 2: The European Parliament should ask the Commission to report 
precisely on the monitoring of EU readmission agreements, during the implementing 
phase. Monitoring mechanisms should be reinforced in order to check whether 
readmission procedures comply with the terms of an EU readmission agreement, 
particularly in situations when no implementing protocol has been signed between a 
given Member State and a third country.  
Importantly, in Title V of the TFEU (“International Agreements”), Art. 218(10) reads that 
“the European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the 
procedure [i.e., from the opening of negotiations to the conclusion of an international 
agreement] [italics added]”. Furthermore, Art. 218(11) of the TFEU stipulates that the 
European Parliament may “obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an 
agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties”. Hence, the right for full information 
at all stages of the procedure, plus the application of the consent procedure (or co-decision 
procedure), added to the possibility of resorting to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to assess compatibility with the Treaties (including the Charter) reflect the EP’s 
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upgraded role in the decisions and talks on readmission agreements before their final 
conclusion.  
Additionally, in accordance with Art. 14(1) of the TEU, the European Parliament will, “jointly 
with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions”. Among others, these 
functions include a political control on the spending stemming from international 
agreements. Consequently, with the assistance of the Court of Auditors (Art. 287(4) of the 
TFEU), the European Parliament will perform this joint responsibility which plausibly 
requires the collection of data and information about the ways in which EU funds, allocated 
to support the implementation by the Member States of the removals carried out in the 
framework of an EU readmission agreement, have been spent to understand whether they 
precisely comply with the terms of the agreement and with the Treaties.  
 Recommendation 3: The full and independent exercise of the EP’s power to give its 
consent to readmission agreements will necessarily depend on the extent to which 
the European Parliament will have access to information relating to the negotiation 
phase, as well as the implementing phase of EU readmission agreements. This may 
lend support to the argument that representatives of the European Parliament 
should be involved in Joint Readmission Committees (JRCs). 
1.3.3  Convergence of contingencies and priorities 
In the above, we have seen that the principle of sincere cooperation requires and justifies 
at the same time the need for regular notification procedures and monitoring mechanisms 
at various stages. There exists, however, a third precondition which needs to be 
considered. It refers to convergence of contingencies and priorities between the Member 
States and the Union. Contingencies pertain to the factors and conditions shaping the 
cooperation on readmission, whereas priorities refer to the drivers of cooperation. When 
convergence is optimal, Member States would entrust or be fully supportive of the Union in 
the field of readmission while recognising the added value and effectiveness of its action.  
However, in practice, this optimal degree of convergence has not been reached so far, 
despite the gradual consolidation of a Common immigration and asylum policy. It is 
important to recall that, whereas EU readmission agreements, once negotiated and 
concluded, take precedence over any bilateral agreement or arrangement with a given third 
country, they continue to constitute a tiny share of the overall number of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission that have been concluded, at a bilateral level, by the 
Member States with third countries.  
Given the objective predominance of bilateral patterns of cooperation on readmission, one 
is entitled to understand whether the drive for europeanization will change this statement 
of fact and, above all, the extent to which Member States’ contingencies and priorities in 
the field of readmission have impacted on those of the Union.  
Admittedly, EU readmission agreements cannot be isolated from this broader and resilient 
framework of bilateral cooperation in the field of readmission. The next chapter sets out to 
explain how cooperation at bilateral level has been configured while focusing on the main 
drivers and factors that have shaped bilateral patterns of cooperation on readmission. It 
also investigates whether the rationale for bilateral patterns of cooperation linked to 
readmission has shaped the EU approach to readmission enshrined in the Global Approach 
to Migration (GAM). 
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2. A PREDOMINANT BILATERAL DIMENSION 
Member States differ markedly in terms of cooperation on readmission, probably owing to 
the types of flows affecting their respective national territories. At the same time, however, 
the ways in which states codify their interaction over time play a crucial role in shaping 
their patterns of cooperation on readmission14. 
This assumption implies that state-to-state interaction, in its broadest sense, impacts on 
the nature of cooperative patterns and on states’ responsiveness to uncertainties. 
Sometimes, they may reciprocally commit themselves to cooperating on readmission by 
concluding a standard readmission agreement because both contracting parties view the 
formalisation as being valuable to each other’s interests. Such agreements are standard in 
the sense that they substantially reflect the provisions and structure of the specimen 
recommended in 1994 by the Council of the European Union. This specimen is mentioned in 
Chapter 2.   
These standard readmission agreements have been subject to various studies (Hailbronner, 
1997; Nascimbene, 2001; Noll, 2005; Arnarsson, 2007) which, for example, stressed the 
reciprocal obligations contained in a readmission agreement as well as the procedures that 
need to be respected to identify undocumented persons (unauthorized migrants, rejected 
asylum seekers, stateless persons, and unaccompanied minors) to subsequently remove 
them out of the territory of a destination country.  
When concluding a standard readmission agreement, the contracting parties agree to carry 
out removal procedures without unnecessary formalities and within reasonable time limits, 
with due respect of their duties under their national legislation and the international 
agreements on human rights and the protection of the status of refugees, in accordance 
with the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1984 UN Convention 
against torture, and more recently the 2000 European Charter on Fundamental Rights. All 
of these internationally recognized instruments oblige states not to expel persons (whether 
migrants or not) to countries and territories where their safety, lives or freedom would be 
threatened in any manner whatsoever. 
Despite the letter of these agreements, various human rights organizations and 
associations in Europe and abroad have repeatedly denounced the lack of transparency that 
surrounds the implementation of readmission agreements and removal operations. Such 
public denunciations have not only questioned the compliance with the obligations and 
principles contained in bilateral readmission agreements, but also have led to growing 
public concerns regarding respect for the rights and safety of the expelled persons.  
In fact, it has to be said that the willingness of a country of origin to conclude a 
readmission agreement does not mean that it has the legal institutional and structural 
capacity to deal with the removal of its nationals, let alone the removal of foreign nationals 
and the protection of their rights. Nor does it mean that the agreement will be effectively or 
fully implemented in the long run, for it involves two contracting parties that do not 
necessarily share the same interest in the bilateral cooperation on readmission. Nor do they 
face the same implications, as previously stated. These considerations are important to 
show that the conclusion of a readmission agreement is motivated by expected benefits 
which are unequally perceived by the contracting parties, on the one hand, and that the 
                                                 
14  Parts of the text draw on the introduction of a recent volume: Cassarino (2010). 
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agreement’s implementation is based on a fragile balance between the concrete benefits 
and costs attached to it, on the other.  
2.1 The fragile balance between costs and benefits 
Whereas a destination country has a vested interest in concluding readmission agreements 
to facilitate the removal of unauthorised migrants, the interest of a country of origin may 
be less evident, above all if its economy remains dependent on the revenues of its (legal 
and unauthorised) expatriates living abroad, or when migration continues to be viewed as a 
safety valve to relieve pressure on domestic unemployment. This statement is particularly 
true regarding the bilateral negotiations on readmission between some EU Member States 
and countries in the South Mediterranean and Africa where economic and political 
differentials are significant. Special trade concessions, preferential entry quotas for 
economic migrants, technical cooperation and assistance, increased development aid and 
short-term visa exemption have been the most common incentives used by the EU-27 
Member States to induce countries in the South Mediterranean and Africa to cooperate on 
readmission. 
At EU level, the entry visa facilitations played a major role in the negotiations of some of 
the agreements concluded so far. 
However, experience has shown on various occasions that compensatory measures ― 
which constitute the most commonly used form of incentive ― may not always induce a 
third country to conclude a standard readmission agreement. Moreover, even when a 
standard agreement is concluded, the high costs stemming from the concrete 
implementation of the agreement make the extent of the actual cooperation highly 
uncertain. For a country of origin, such costs are not just financial. Nor do the costs stem 
only from the structural institutional and legal reforms needed to implement the 
cooperation. They also lie in the unpopularity of the standard readmission agreement and 
in the fact that its full implementation might have a negative impact on the relationship 
between the state and society in a country of origin. 
2.2 Grafting readmission on to other policy areas 
If we follow the conventional wisdom, we may believe that states negotiate and conclude 
readmission agreements as an end in itself. However, readmission agreements are rarely 
an end in itself but rather one of the many ways to consolidate a broader bilateral 
cooperative framework, including other strategic (and perhaps more crucial) policy areas 
such as security, energy, trade, and counter-terrorism. Often, the decision to cooperate on 
readmission results from a form of rapprochement that shapes the intensity of the quid pro 
quo. 
There are various examples which support this argument. In February 1992, Morocco and 
Spain signed a readmission agreement in the wake of a reconciliation process which 
materialised following the signing of the Treaty of Good-neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation on 4 July 1991 (Cassarino, 2007). Morocco’s acceptance to conclude this 
agreement was motivated by its ambition to acquire a special status in its political and 
economic relationships with the European Union (Mrabet, 2003). Likewise, in January 2007 
Italy and Egypt concluded a readmission agreement as a result of reinforced bilateral 
exchanges between the two countries. Such reinforced exchanges have allowed Egypt to 
benefit from a bilateral debt swap agreement, as well as from trade concessions for its 
agricultural produce and, additionally, temporary entry quotas for Egyptian nationals in 
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Italy. Importantly, the rapprochement between Italy and Egypt was key to integrating the 
latter into the G1415 while acquiring enhanced regime legitimacy at the international level. 
Similarly, the bilateral agreement on the circulation of persons and readmission concluded 
in July 2006 between the United Kingdom and Algeria, while still not in force, is not an 
exception to the rule. This agreement, limited to the removal of the nationals of the 
contracting parties, took place in the context of a whole round of negotiations, including 
such strategic issues as energy security, the fight against terrorism, and police cooperation. 
These strategic issues have become top priorities in the bilateral relations between the 
United Kingdom and Algeria; particularly following the July 2005 London bombings and the 
ensuing G8 meeting in Gleneagles that Algeria also attended (Cassarino, 2007).  
These few examples are important to show that the issue of readmission weaves its way 
through various policy areas. It has been, as it were, grafted on to other issues of ‘high 
politics’, such as the fight against international terrorism, energy security, the reconciliation 
process, reinforced border controls, special trade concessions, and, last but not least, the 
search for regime legitimacy and strategic alliances. It is this whole bilateral cooperative 
framework that secures a minimum operability in the cooperation on readmission more 
than the ‘reciprocal’ and binding obligations contained in a standard readmission 
agreement. EU policy-makers know that the reciprocal obligations contained in a standard 
readmission agreement are too asymmetrical to secure its concrete implementation in the 
long run. They also know that grafting the cooperation on readmission on to other policy 
areas may compensate for the unbalanced reciprocal obligations characterising the 
cooperation on readmission or removal. It is because of this awareness, which arguably 
resulted from a learning process, that the cobweb of readmission agreements has acquired 
formidable dimensions over the last fifteen years or so. However, this tells us just a part of 
the story. 
 Recommendation 4: In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, and 
with due respect to the Treaties, Member States should inform the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament about the extent to which grafting readmission 
on to other strategic policy areas is consistent with the “fulfilment of their 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of 
the Union” (Art. 4 (3), TEU).  
3. THE DRIVE FOR FLEXIBILITY 
We have seen that cooperative mechanisms may be formalised, as is often the case, 
through the conclusion of standard readmission agreements if both contracting parties view 
this as being valuable to each other’s interests. However, making an inventory of bilateral 
standard readmission agreements, as described above, would never suffice to illustrate the 
proliferation of cooperative patterns on readmission, for these have become highly 
diversified as a result of various concomitant factors. In other words, we need to look 
beyond standard readmission agreements to provide a more complete picture of the 
various mechanisms and cooperative instruments that have emerged recently, at bilateral 
level.  
                                                 
15  The first G14 meeting took place in L’Aquila (Italy) in July 2009. The G14 comprises the world’s most 
wealthy and industrialised countries (G8) plus the G5, i.e., the group of emerging economies (Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, and South Africa), and Egypt.  
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Under some circumstances, both contracting parties may decide to readjust their 
cooperation in order to “reduce the chance that either state will want to incur the costs of 
reneging or be forced to endure an unsatisfactory division of gains for long periods” 
(Koremenos, 2005, p. 551). Circumstances and uncertainties alike change over time, 
making flexible arrangements preferable over rigid ones. They may agree to cooperate on 
readmission without necessarily basing their cooperation on a standard agreement, as 
recommended by the Council of the European Union in 1994. They may opt for different 
ways of dealing with readmission through exchanges of letters and memoranda of 
understanding or by choosing to frame their cooperation via other types of deals (e.g., 
police cooperation agreements, arrangements, and pacts). 
The main rationale for the adoption of non-standard agreements is to secure bilateral 
cooperation on migration management, including readmission, and to respond flexibly to 
new situations fraught with uncertainties. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
concrete implementation of the cooperative agreement over time, states may want to 
secure their credibility through agreements “that include the proper amount of flexibility 
and thereby create for themselves a kind of international insurance” (Koremenos, 2005, p. 
562). With reference to the cooperation on readmission, this argument does not imply that 
states do not make any credible commitments when signing agreements. On the contrary, 
it is because of their search for credibility that they may opt for flexible patterns of 
cooperation when it comes to dealing with highly sensitive matters such as readmission or 
removal.  
Credibility is a core issue in the cooperation on readmission (Phuong, 2007, p. 356), for it 
symbolically buttresses the centrality of the state and its law-enforcement agencies in the 
management of international migration. The cooperation on readmission has often been 
presented by European leaders to their constituencies and the international community as 
an integral part of the fight against illegal migration and as instruments protecting their 
immigration and asylum systems.  
This cause-and-effect relationship, predicated by political leaders, shows to constituencies 
that governments have the credible ability to respond to and even anticipate shocks (e.g., 
mass arrivals of unauthorised migrants), because of the existence of specific mechanisms. 
However, shocks generate uncertainty which might, in turn, jeopardize the effective 
cooperation on readmission, particularly when it comes to addressing the pressing issue of 
re-documentation within agreed time limits, that is, the delivery of travel documents or 
laissez-passers by the consular authorities of the third country needed to remove 
undocumented migrants. It is a well-known fact that the above-mentioned readmission 
agreement concluded in 1992 between Spain and Morocco has never been fully 
implemented. This agreement foresees the readmission of the nationals of the contracting 
parties as well as the third-country nationals. Diplomatic tensions between the two 
countries hampered the bilateral cooperation on readmission, particularly under the José 
María Aznar government (1996−2004). Thus far, Morocco’s cooperation on the delivery of 
travel documents at the request of the Spanish authorities has been erratic. 
Changing circumstances may upset the balance of perceived costs and benefits and be 
conducive to defection. Because of the uncertainties surrounding the concrete 
implementation of a readmission agreement, various EU Member States have been prone 
to show some flexibility in readjusting their patterns of cooperation with some third 
countries in order to address re-documentation and the swift delivery of travel documents 
or laissez-passers. The faster the delivery of travel documents, the shorter the duration of 
detention, and the cheaper its costs. 
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3.1 The non-standard approach 
Over the last few decades, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have been 
at the forefront of a new wave of agreements linked to readmission. They are linked to 
readmission in that they cannot be properly dubbed readmission agreements, in the 
technical sense or with reference to the model of readmission agreement recommended by 
the Council of the European Union to the EU Member States in 1994. These agreements 
(e.g., memoranda of understanding, arrangements, pacts, and police cooperation 
agreements including a clause on readmission) are often based on a three-pronged 
approach covering: 1) the fight against unauthorized migration, including the issue of 
readmission, 2) the reinforced control of borders, including ad hoc technical assistance, and 
3) the joint management of labour migration with third countries of origin, including 
enhanced development aid. For example, this approach is enshrined in Spain’s Plán Africa 
as well as in France’s pacts on the joint management of international migration and co-
development. 
As mentioned earlier, circumstances change over time, and uncertainty might upset the 
fragile balance of costs and benefits linked to the bilateral cooperation on readmission. 
These non-standard agreements have been responsive to various factors. First, they tend 
to lower the cost of defection or reneging on the agreement, for they can be renegotiated 
easily in order to respond to new contingencies. In contrast to standard readmission 
agreements, they do not require a lengthy ratification process when renegotiation takes 
place. Second, they lower the public visibility of the cooperation on readmission by placing 
it in a broader framework of interaction. This element is particularly relevant for emigration 
countries located in the South Mediterranean and in Africa, where the cooperation on 
readmission is politically unpopular and where governments are reluctant to publicise it. 
Under these circumstances, governments in emigration countries would become more 
acquiescent in cooperating in the framework of agreements linked to readmission while 
being, at the same time, in a position to publicly abhor the use of standard readmission 
agreements. Third, they allow for flexible and operable solutions aimed at addressing the 
need for cooperation on readmission. The agenda remains unchanged, but the operability 
of the cooperation on readmission has been prioritized over its formalisation. Fourth, non-
standard agreements linked to readmission are by their nature difficult to detect and 
monitor, for they are not necessarily published in official bulletins. Nor are they always 
recorded in official documents or correspondence. The characteristics of such hybrid 
patterns of cooperation linked to readmission might be critical when it comes to evaluating 
the extent to which national practices comply with the principles of EU law. 
There is no question that flexibility has acquired increased importance in the practice of 
readmission over the last fifteen years or so. Indeed, the number of non-standard 
agreements linked to readmission concluded between the EU Member States and third 
countries has risen over the last decade, together with the increase in standard 
readmission agreements. When the former European Community comprised 15 Member 
States (1995-2003), non-standard agreements linked to readmission numbered 38 against 
118 standard readmission agreements. In August 2010, at the level of the 27 EU Member 
States, non-standard agreements linked to readmission numbered 63 against 190 standard 
readmission agreements16. 
                                                 
16  There is no official inventory of all the agreements linked to readmission concluded by the 27 Member 
States of the European Union, at a bilateral level. The data reported here are based on research conducted 
at the Migration Policy Centre in the framework of the Mirem project (www.mirem.eu). The last initiative at 
EU level aimed at collecting such information dates back to 1999.  
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The sharp increase in standard readmission agreements stems from the gradual 
enlargement of the European Union and from the fact that some third countries regarded 
the conclusion of such readmission agreements as a way of consolidating their relations 
with the European bloc. Third countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans have 
had a concrete incentive to cooperate on readmission. Their option to cooperate could also 
be justified to their constituencies while referring to their planned accession to the EU (e.g., 
the Eastern European countries which acceded the EU in 2004) or to expected benefits from 
a rapprochement with the EU (e.g., Croatia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, and, more recently, Kosovo). Moreover, additional incentives included the 
possibility to benefit from preferential visa facilitation agreements (Trauner and Kruse, 
2008). 
In contrast to countries located in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, third countries 
in the Mediterranean and in Africa have, from a general point of view, been involved in a 
mix of standard agreements and flexible arrangements aimed at cooperating on 
readmission. As previously mentioned, incentives to conclude (visible and unpopular) 
standard readmission agreements do not fully explain the proliferation of cooperative 
agreements linked to readmission, for they may not always offset the unbalanced 
obligations and asymmetric costs and benefits that characterize the cooperation.   
The growing number of non-standard agreements has had a certain bearing on the 
proliferation of agreements linked to readmission. Today, the cobweb of bilateral 
agreements linked to readmission has grown considerably, involving more than one 
hundred countries throughout the world. Figure 1 (next page) schematically illustrates the 
cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission concluded between the 27 EU 
Member States plus the Schengen associated countries (depicted in blue), on the one hand, 
and third countries (in light green), on the other17.  
The size of each circle (or node) has been weighted with regard to the total number of 
bilateral agreements linked to readmission (whether standard or not) concluded between 
the two groups of countries. In other words, the bigger the circle, the denser the web of 
agreements linked to readmission in which each country is involved. This weighting is 
necessary to show that the cooperation on readmission is far from being a concern equally 
shared by the Member States and Schengen associated countries. Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland and the United Kingdom have been the 
most involved in bilateral cooperation on readmission. Clearly, their respective patterns of 
cooperation vary with the type of flows affecting their national territories, geographical 
proximity, the nature and intensity of their interaction (in terms of power relations) and, 
finally, with the third country’s responsiveness to the need for enhanced cooperation on 
readmission. Moreover, another interesting aspect of Graph 1 is that it clearly reflects the 
predominance of bilateralism in the field of readmission and that all the third countries in 
Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, which are currently involved in an EU 
readmission agreement, were already involved in the pre-existing bilateral patterns of 
                                                 
17  For the sake of clarity, Figure 1 does not plot the numerous readmission agreements that have been 
concluded over the last decades, at a bilateral level, between the 27 EU Member States, Switzerland, 
Iceland, and Norway. Nor does it plot the growing number of agreements linked to readmission that third 
countries have concluded among themselves. Finally, Finland is not reported on Figure 1, for it has no 
known agreement linked to readmission with any third country. 
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            30
cooperation on readmission with a large number of Member States. In other words, the 
conclusion and entry into force of EU readmission agreements with these specific third 
countries followed hard on the heels of an established framework of bilateral cooperation 
which arguably contributed, among many others factors (see Section 4.2.), to the success 
of the negotiations at an EU level. 
 Readmission Policy in the European Union 
 
Figure 1. Known bilateral agreements linked to readmission concluded between the Member States and Schengen 
associated countries, on the one hand, and the world, on the other, August 2010 
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Incidentally, Denmark and Germany ― like Switzerland ― tend, from a general point of 
view, to cooperate on readmission through the conclusion of standard agreements. This 
inclination may stem from the fact that their negotiations have been mainly (though not 
exclusively) concluded with third countries in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the 
Caucasus (e.g., Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Moldova, 
Ukraine, and Kosovo) which, as explained earlier, have had a concrete incentive to 
cooperate on readmission and to formalize their cooperation while grafting it onto other 
strategic policy areas.  
Conversely, Italy, Greece, France, Spain and the United Kingdom have been confronted 
with the need to adapt their respective cooperative patterns, above all when it comes to 
interacting on the issue of readmission with some Mediterranean and African countries. 
Past experience has already shown that these third countries have been less inclined to 
conclude standard readmission agreements, or even to fully implement them when such 
agreements were concluded, owing to the potentially disruptive impact of their (visible) 
commitments on the domestic economy and social stability, and on their external relations 
with their African neighbours. At the same time, however, other factors have justified such 
ad hoc readjustments.  
3.2 Factors shaping the cooperation on readmission 
More than an obligation under international customary law, the practice of readmission is, 
as it were, yoked to complex contingencies. Practice means that two states may decide to 
implement readmission without necessarily tying their hands with an agreement, whether 
standard or not. Under these circumstances, the practice may be viewed as being sporadic. 
What really matters is the assurance that the requested state (i.e., a country of transit or 
of origin) will be responsive to the expectations of the requesting state (i.e., a destination 
country). For example, a country of origin may agree to issue travel documents, at the 
request of a destination country, that are needed to expel or readmit undocumented 
migrants without necessarily having an agreement. The issuance of travel documents will 
be based on a form of tacit assurance that the requested country will be responsive. 
The transition from practice to cooperation on readmission occurs, however, when the 
responsiveness to perceived exigencies has to be ensured on a more regular basis, not 
sporadically. A country of destination may seek to secure the regular responsiveness of its 
counterpart by concluding a treaty or a standard agreement based on reciprocal 
commitments and obligations to cooperate on readmission. At the outset, three interrelated 
factors may lead to the conclusion of readmission agreements at the request of a 
destination country.  
The first factor pertains to geographical proximity. Countries sharing a common land or 
maritime border may have a higher propensity to cooperate on readmission. This 
assumption holds true in the case of Spain and Morocco which concluded a standard 
readmission agreement in 1992. Conversely, it is not explanatory in the case of 
neighbouring Portugal and Morocco which, despite their common maritime border, have no 
bilateral standard readmission agreement. To account for this contrast we need to combine 
geographical proximity with other factors. 
The second factor refers to migration salience. This reflects the extent to which migration 
and mobility have become a salient component of the development of the bilateral relations 
between two countries. Migration, or the movement of people, has become over time a key 
feature of their historical relations. Migration salience may be observed in post-colonial 
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regimes, where the mobility of people is part and parcel of the interaction between former 
colonial powers and their former colonies. It may also apply to two countries characterized 
by repeated exchanges of people and the presence of large émigré communities. If viewed 
as being significant in the negotiation process, migration salience might hinder the 
conclusion of a standard readmission agreement, for the unpopular conclusion of such an 
agreement would jeopardise the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In other 
words, migration salience may turn out to be detrimental to the conclusion of standard 
readmission agreements, let alone their concrete implementation.  
The third factor pertains to incentives. Expected absolute and relative gains allow the 
unbalanced reciprocities characterizing the cooperation on readmission to be overcome. 
This has often explained the reasons for which various countries of origin and of transit in 
the Western Balkans and in Eastern Europe have had a vested interest to conclude 
readmission agreements at the request of EU Member States. Their responsiveness was 
conditionally linked to an array of incentives including, among others, short-term visa 
exemption, trade concessions, preferential entry quotas for given commodities, technical 
assistance, and increased development aid. However, incentives do not always explain or 
secure cooperation on readmission in the long term. Under some circumstances, expected 
benefits might not always offset the costs of the cooperation on readmission. Costs are not 
only linked to the concrete implementation of the agreement and its consequences, but 
also to its unpopularity at the social level. Moreover, even when incentives were viewed, at 
a certain point in time, as being significant enough to cooperate on readmission, the 
(unintended) costs of the cooperation incurred by a country of origin or transit might 
eventually jeopardize the cooperative relationship and be conducive to reneging. Incentives 
do not always offset the fragile balance of costs and benefits; above all, when migration 
salience might hinder the cooperation on readmission. 
Arguably, none of the three factors described above could individually account for states’ 
intervention in the field of readmission. Cooperation on readmission lies at the intersection 
of these three factors. Combined together, these factors delimit the boundaries of a 
triangular domain where the cooperation, based on a standard readmission agreement, is 
practicable and where the significance of each of the three factors will be weighted against 
each other, over time and in an ad hoc manner.  
However, this triangular domain provides an incomplete explanation when it comes to 
analyzing the emergence of non-standard agreements linked to readmission (e.g., 
memoranda of understanding, pacts, exchanges of letters, police cooperation agreement 
including a clause on readmission).  
The gradual importance that such agreements are acquiring at the bilateral level results 
from the consideration of a fourth factor that has emerged over the last few years 
prompting some EU Member States to adjust or even readjust their cooperative framework 
with some non-EU source countries. This readjustment was not only motivated by the need 
for flexibility with a view to securing the operability of the cooperation on readmission. It 
also stemmed from the perceptible empowerment of some source countries as a result of 
their proactive involvement in the reinforced police control of the EU external borders 
(Paoletti, 2010). As a matter of fact, with reference to the South Mediterranean, countries 
like Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Turkey, and Egypt have become gradually aware of 
their empowerment. Their cooperation on border controls has not only allowed these 
Mediterranean countries to play the efficiency card in the field of migration and border 
management, while gaining further international credibility and regime legitimacy; it has 
also allowed them to acquire a strategic position in migration and border management talks 
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on which they tend to capitalize. There can be no question that this perceptible 
empowerment has had serious implications on the ways in which the cooperation on 
readmission has been adaptively addressed, reconfigured and codified, leading to the 
conclusion of (flexible and less visible) patterns of cooperation on readmission.   
The combination of the four factors allows the conclusion of agreements linked to 
readmission (whether standard or not) to be better explained.  
3.3 Case studies 
Various case studies support the analytical relevance of the abovementioned four factors. 
To give just a few examples, France had to adjust its cooperative patterns on readmission 
with most North and West African countries as a result of this combination: first, because 
the management of labour migration has been part and parcel of France’s diplomatic 
relations with these third countries. The (visible) negotiation of an unpopular standard 
readmission agreement would have jeopardized France’s relations with these countries 
(i.e., migration salience). Second, because the aforementioned third countries have 
acquired a strategic position through their participation in the reinforced control of the EU 
external borders and in the fight against illegal migration and international terrorism (i.e., 
empowerment). Bringing pressure to bear on these neighbouring (and strategic) third 
countries to conclude a standard readmission agreement would have been difficult, if not 
counterproductive.   
Conversely, France was in a position to negotiate standard readmission agreements with 
numerous Latin American countries, for their visible conclusion would not have significantly 
impaired bilateral relations, and because migration management does not constitute, for 
now, an issue of high politics in the relations between these geographically remote 
countries and France (migration salience is not a significant factor). Under these 
circumstances, France reinforced its cooperation on the exemption of short-term visas to 
the nationals of cooperative Latin American countries (i.e., incentives) by means of bilateral 
exchanges of letters. Conversely, Spain has few readmission agreements with Latin 
American countries, probably owing to the fact that migration management constitutes an 
issue of high politics (i.e., migration salience) in the history of its bilateral relations with 
Latin American countries. 
It is the combination of these four factors that seems to account for the increase in the 
number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission while at the same time explaining 
their diversity. Their diversity results from a form of selective readjustment that soon 
became more a necessity than an option given the empowered position that some third 
countries acquired through their proactive involvement in the reinforced control of the EU 
external borders. The next section explores whether and how the combination of these four 
factors has shaped the EU approach to readmission. 
3.4 EU Mobility partnerships: Drawing on Member States 
experience 
Just like various EU Member States, the European Commission has also become aware that 
it is no longer the moment to exert indiscriminate pressure on third countries to induce 
them to cooperate effectively on readmission. In a communication dated 30 November 
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2006, the European Commission expressed its intention to “broker a deal” 18 with a view to 
facilitating the conclusion of EU readmission agreements with third countries while learning 
from the bilateral experiences of the EU Member States. 
This statement did mark a watershed in the EU approach to negotiations on readmission, 
for it revealed the growing awareness on the part of the European Commission of the need 
to strike a new compromise with selected third countries, particularly with those located in 
the EU neighbourhood, in order to speed up the negotiation process of EU readmission 
agreements. 
This readjustment could be viewed as a response to changed circumstances. On the one 
hand, as explained above, it also results from altered power relations with neighbouring 
third countries located in Africa and the Mediterranean, following their proactive 
involvement in the control of the external borders of the EU (i.e., empowerment). It also 
results from the awareness that incentives proposed would not alone induce third countries 
to become more cooperative on the thorny question of readmission, given its visibility and 
costs (see section 3.1). 
On the other hand, it results from the need to respond proactively to EU internal 
challenges. As a matter of fact, a number of Member States, particularly France, Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, and Greece, started to express growing concerns about the progress made by 
the European Commission in the fight against unauthorised migration while implicitly 
questioning the EC mandate to negotiate Community readmission agreements with some 
third countries, owing to the slow process of negotiation. 
Member States have demonstrated their concern in numerous ways regarding the capacity 
of the EU institutions to deal effectively with unauthorized migration, including readmission: 
1) The founding of the G5 (today’s G6) in 2003, which brings together the interior ministers 
of France, Spain, the U.K., Italy, Germany, and Poland (since 2006); 2) The signing of the 
Prüm Treaty19 on May 27, 2005. The treaty is aimed at stepping up cross-border police 
cooperation and exchanges between Member States’ law-enforcement agencies to combat 
organized crime, terrorism, and illegal migration. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain are signatories; 3) The writing of an open letter in 
September 2006 to the then Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
calling for reinforced common concrete actions to counter mass arrivals in Southern 
Europe. The letter came from the heads of state of Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain; 4) The delivery of a document20 to the then Czech 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, pressing for the conclusion and effective 
                                                 
18  “Experiences have demonstrated that to broker a deal the EU needs to offer something in return. In their 
bilateral readmission negotiations Member States are increasingly offering also other forms of support and 
assistance to third countries to facilitate the conclusion of such agreements, and the possibilities of 
applying this wider approach at EU level [i.e., the Global Approach to Migration] should be explored” 
(European Commission 2006, p. 9). 
19  The Prüm Treaty or Convention was signed by seven EU member states: Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Sweden are waiting to join. The Convention aims at stepping up cross-border police 
cooperation and exchanges between members’ law-enforcement agencies with a view to combating 
organised crime, terrorism and illegal migration more effectively. Provisions of the Prüm Treaty dealing with 
police co-operation and information exchange on DNA-profiles, and fingerprints were transposed in the 
legal framework of the European Union following a Council Decision dated 23rd June 2008 (Council Decision 
2008/606/JHA). 
20  “Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta Paper”, Ministers of the Interior and (for Malta) Minister of Justice and 
Internal Affairs, 13 January 2009. 
http://www.cittadinitalia.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/16/0970_Final_paper_Versione_fi
rmata.pdf. This document was mentioned in European Council (2009), 2927th Council meeting Justice and 
Home Affairs Brussels, 26 and 27 February 2009, p. 9. 
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implementation of Community readmission agreements. The document, dated 13 January 
2009, came from Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. These four countries formed the Quadro 
Group during the French EU Presidency (July-December 2008) to keep illegal immigration 
on the EU agenda. 
A new EU compromise in the field of readmission was needed as a result of internal and 
external pressures. It found its expression in the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) which 
was described as “a comprehensive approach [combining] measures aimed at facilitating 
legal migration opportunities with those reducing illegal migration” (European Council, 
2007, p. 3). Key mechanisms for strategic cooperation with selected third countries were 
introduced in the framework of the GAM.  
Mobility partnerships and their rationale form an integral part of the GAM. They are tailor-
made and encompass a broad range of issues ranging from development aid to temporary 
entry visa facilitation, circular migration schemes and the fight against illegal migration, 
including the cooperation on readmission. They are selective in that they are addressed to 
those third countries once certain conditions are met, such as cooperation on illegal 
migration and the existence of “effective mechanisms for readmission”21. 
The EU’s attempt to link mobility partnerships with cooperation on readmission reflects how 
this issue has become a central component of its immigration policy. This conditional link is 
also stressed in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum that was sponsored by 
France and endorsed by the 27 EU Member States in October 2008. 
Additional factors explain this conditionality. First, readmission is all the more central for 
the EU and its Member States as the control of the European external borders and border 
restrictions affect the fluid and repeated back and forth movements inherent in the mobility 
of people. The EU and its Member States are aware of the fact that, because of border 
restrictions and the difficult access to labour markets in destination countries, migrants 
might be tempted to extend their stay abroad22 or to overstay and become irregular. 
Second, the resilient differentials in standards of living, economic development, working 
conditions, welfare and political governance between origin and destination countries 
cannot be overlooked. Third, countries of origin might be tempted not to respect their 
commitment, above all when it comes to dealing with the readmission and redocumentation 
of their nationals. This explains why mobility partnerships are assessed on a regular basis 
by the parties involved (European Commission, 2007a, p. 4).  
Mobility partnerships stem from the consolidation of a new compromise encompassing a 
large array of issues ranging from development aid, to temporary entry visa facilitation, 
circular migration schemes and the fight against illegal migration including readmission. 
They are presented as a paradigmatic “shift from a primarily security-centred approach 
focused on reducing migratory pressures to a more transparent and balanced approach” 
(European Commission, 2008, p. 3) based on the formulation of commitments expressed in 
the framework of exploratory talks where dialogue and mutual understanding are favoured.  
                                                 
21  Mobility partnerships “would be agreed with those third countries committed to fighting illegal immigration 
and that have effective mechanisms for readmission” (European Commission 2007, p. 19). 
22  This point draws on Heaven Crawley’s statement reported in House of Commons International Development 
Committee, Migration and Development: How to make migration work for poverty reduction, Sixth report of 
Session 2003-2004, vol. 1, 8 July 2004. “When people come to a country […] through a managed migration 
programme often they have had quite a difficult time getting onto that programme in the first place, and 
when they get to the [destination country] their first thought is not to think about how to return, because 
they found it difficult trying to get here in the first place, it is more about how to stay”. (see §71, pp. 40-
41).  
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Since late 2007, the Commission has been invited by the Council to launch pilot mobility 
partnerships with few countries. In June 2008, Cape Verde23 and Moldova24 signed 
partnerships with the EU, Georgia25 in November 2009, whereas Senegal is still negotiating 
its accord at the time of writing. It is interesting to note that negotiations on mobility 
partnerships have been successful so far with third countries having, as it were, a weak 
leverage on European affairs. Conversely, given its strategic role in the control of the EU 
external borders and its perceptible empowered position in migration talks, it is likely that 
negotiations with Senegal on a mobility partnership might turn out to be lengthier, if not 
tricky.  
 
Table 2. List of Mobility Partnerships 
Third country Mandate Date of signature 
Cape Verde  December 2007 5 June 2008  
Georgia  June 2008 30 November 2009  
Moldova  December 2007 5 June 2008  
Senegal  June 2008   
Clearly, it is too early to assess the impact of mobility partnerships and to argue whether 
their broader policy framework (i.e., the GAM) will foster any progress in the consolidation 
of an EU readmission policy or otherwise. Admittedly, mobility partnerships are not EU 
readmission agreements, neither in their rationale nor in their form. However, they are no 
less arrangements aimed at addressing an array of issues prioritised in the GAM, including 
readmission.  
They show that the European Commission is intent on adaptively revamping its cooperative 
framework on readmission in an ad hoc and more flexible manner while “taking into 
account the current state of the EU’s relations with the third country concerned as well as 
the general approach towards it in EU external relations” (European Commission, 2007a: 
3). Also, mobility partnerships represent a trust-building platform addressed not only to 
third countries (whether these have been empowered or not), but also to interested 
Member States. In other words, the latter are free to take part in mobility partnerships if 
they consider that the partnership adds value to their current bilateral relations with a 
given partner country or not. Moreover, they may conclude bilateral agreements in various 
areas. Implementation remains a bilateral prerogative of the Member States. Monitoring 
bodies (i.e., the Groupe Local de Suivi in Cape Verde and the National Monitoring 
Committee on the Mobility Partnership in Moldova) comprise representatives of third 
Member States' diplomatic missions and the EC Delegation. They are aimed at assessing 
the progress of implementation of the partnership. 
It is important to stress that mobility partnerships are not only designed to foster 
cooperation on various migration-related areas, while proposing incentives in terms of legal 
migration and visa facilitation to cooperative third countries. When viewed as a platform for 
dialogue and consultations, such partnerships are also deemed to consolidate, through 
repeated exchanges among officials, the GAM agenda by identifying shared problems and 
                                                 
23  European Council (2008), Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Cape 
Verde, 9460/08 Add 2, Brussels, 21 May 2008. 
24  European Council (2008), Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and 
Moldova, 9460/08, Brussels, 21 May 2008. 
25  European Council (2009), Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and 
Georgia, 16396/09, Brussels, November 2009. 
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perceived (new) priorities. In their attempt to “build mutual understanding and trust”, as a 
prerequisite to entering into negotiations, mobility partnerships are reflective of the EU 
attempt to place readmission in a broader framework of interaction. The main issue at 
stake is not only about proposing incentives to cooperate on readmission, even if, as stated 
in various communications from the Commission, this issue constitutes a key element of 
mobility partnerships. Rather, through repetition and regular exchanges among 
stakeholders, it is about consolidating a system whereby the cooperation on readmission 
would become more predictable. This system and its implications are analysed in the next 
chapter. 
4. THE READMISSION SYSTEM  
There can be no question that relative-gains-seeking and incentives can help explain the 
reasons for which two state actors cooperate on readmission. Such relative gains do 
motivate state actors to cooperate or not. However, this assumption does not necessarily 
mean that “relative gains pervade international politics nearly enough to make the strong 
realist position hold in general” (Snidal, 1991, p. 703). There also exist “particular systems” 
(Dryzek et al 1989, p. 502) shaped by beliefs, values, and dominant schemes of 
understanding that can have an impact on the conditions conducive to cooperation, as well 
as on states’ perceptions and behaviour.  
The recognition of such systems is important in the framework of this study insofar as it 
lays emphasis on the need to consider the existence of a causal link between beliefs and 
(perceived) interests, subjectivities and priorities, as well as between values and policy 
agendas. The point is not so much to analyze the costs and benefits linked with the 
cooperation on readmission. The main question lies in exploring the system whereby the 
cooperation on readmission has become more predictable over the last ten years or so.  
4.1  Repeated orientations and understandings 
The international agenda for the management of migration is perhaps the most emblematic 
expression of this belief system assuming that it “is the product of individual subjects and, 
once created, provides a context for the further development of their subjectivity” Dryzek 
et al 1989, p. 502). The reference to the management of international migration is today 
part and parcel of state officials’ language and discourses. In a document of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), it is described as being based on a series of 
“common understandings outlining fundamental shared assumptions and principles [among 
state actors] underlying migration management” (IOM, 2004). The agenda is also aimed at 
creating state-led mechanisms designed to “influence migration flows” (Salt, 2000, p. 11). 
However, its repeated reference implies much more than the capacity to influence 
migration flows.  
Beyond their conflicting sovereign interests, countries of origin, transit, and destination 
share a common objective in the migration management agenda: introducing regulatory 
mechanisms buttressing their position as legitimate managers of the mobility of their 
nationals and foreigners. The dramatic increase in the number of agreements linked to 
readmission, and the adoption of mobility partnerships, cannot be isolated from the 
consolidation of this agenda, at the regional and international levels.  
The international agenda for the management of migration has gained momentum through 
the organization of state-led international consultations in various regions of the world. 
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Such regular consultations, or regional consultative processes (RCPs),26 were critical in 
opening regular channels of communication among the representatives of countries of 
destination, of transit, and of origin. Scholars have already analyzed the ways in which 
RCPs can be referred to as networks of socialization (Thouez and Channac, 2008, p. 384; 
Carrera and Guild, 2008, p. 3) or “informal policy networks” (Lavenex, 2008, p. 940) 
between state representatives, establishing connections and relationships and defining 
roles and behaviours.  
At the same time, RCPs have contributed to defining common orientations and 
understandings (Klekowski von Koppenfels, 2001, p. 24) as to how the movement of all 
persons should be influenced and controlled. Through their repetition, they have instilled 
guiding principles which in turn have been erected as normative values shaping how 
international migration should best be administered, regulated, and understood.  
In addition to their recurrence, such intergovernmental consultations have gradually 
introduced a new lexicon including such words and notions as predictability, sustainability, 
orderliness, interoperability, harmonization, root causes, comprehensiveness, illegal 
migration, prevention, shared responsibility, joint ownership, balanced approach, and 
temporariness. There is no question that this lexicon, endorsed and used by governmental 
and intergovernmental agencies, among others, has achieved a terminological hegemony in 
today’s official discourses and rhetoric as applied to international migration. It has also 
been critical in manufacturing a top-down framework of understanding while reinforcing, at 
the same time, the managerial centrality of the state and of its law-enforcement 
bureaucracy. 
4.2 Shared perceived priorities 
This has had various implications. Perhaps the most important of which lies in having built 
a hierarchy of priorities aimed at best achieving the objectives set out in the migration 
management agenda. The above lexicon was of course a prerequisite to giving sense to this 
hierarchy of priorities, for its main function is to delineate the contours of the issues which 
should be tackled first and foremost. This hierarchy of priorities has gradually been 
conducive to a process of consensus formation based on the identification of “perceived 
exigencies” (Cox, 2006) while hiding others.  
The cooperation on readmission is perhaps the most symptomatic feature of this process of 
consensus formation and “shared problem perceptions” as analysed by Sandra Lavenex and 
Nicole Wichmann (2009, p. 98). Today, it stands high in the hierarchy of priorities set by 
countries of destination, transit, and origin, whether they are poor or rich, large or small, 
democratically organized or totalitarian.  
Readmission has become a mundane technique to combat unauthorized migration and to 
address the removal of rejected asylum seekers. It is important to stress that cooperating 
on readmission does not only allow states to show they have the credible ability to prevent 
or respond to uncertainties, as mentioned earlier. It has also contributed, by the same 
token, to making their constituencies (more) aware of the presence of the sovereign within 
                                                 
26  “While the first RCP was established in 1985, the majority of RCPs have emerged since 1995, often as a 
result of specific events or developments ― for example, the fall of the Soviet Union, sudden major influxes 
of irregular migrants, and concerns over security linked to the events of 9/11” (IOM, source: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/regional-consultative-processes, accessed 30 August 2010). Major RCPs on 
migration include, among many others, the 2001 Berne Initiative, the 1991 Budapest Process, the 1996 
Puebla Process, the 2002 5+5 dialogue on migration in the Mediterranean, the 2003 Mediterranean transit 
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a specific territorial entity at a time when the role of the welfare state is under heavy strain 
all over the European Union. In other words, keeping out the undesirables is not only a 
question of immigration control and security agenda. It is also an issue closely linked with 
the expression of state authority and sanction, or rather with states’ capacity of classifying 
aliens and citizens alike, as well as their rights, privileges and position in a territorialized 
society (Engbersen 2009, pp. 166-167). In this respect, William Walters asks whether “the 
gradual strengthening of the citizen-territory link [has] less to do with any positive right of 
the citizen to inhabit a particular land, and more to do with the acquisition by states of a 
technical capacity (border controls, and so on) to refuse entry to non-citizens and 
undesirables” (Walters, 2002 p. 267). 
Actually, the role of the state in protecting its citizens and in defending their rights and 
privileges has been linked with its capacity to secure its borders and to regulate migration 
flows.  
In a similar vein, the mass arrivals of unauthorized migrants, including potential asylum-
seekers, has been interpreted as a threat to the integrity of the immigration and asylum 
systems in the European Union. Most importantly, the use of such notions as ‘mixed flows’, 
‘asylum shopping’, ‘bogus asylum-seekers’, ‘unwanted migrants’, ‘burden’, and ‘safe third 
countries’ have started to shape public discourses, more intensively as well as the actions 
of governmental institutions, while implicitly depicting a negative perception of the claims 
of foreigners (migrants and asylum-seekers) in general. Michael Collyer aptly explains how 
the establishment of a ‘security paradigm’ (2008, p. 121) around migration has gradually 
consolidated a dominant discourse as applied to aliens, particularly undocumented 
migrants, who are referred to as invisible threats “who are to be found not in society but on 
the state’s territory” (Collyer, 2008 p. 130).  
There is no question that the consolidation of a security paradigm has contributed to 
favouring the adoption of measures prioritizing the superior need to respond to perceived 
threats. However, this prioritization process, as shown by George Joffé, might lead to the 
“implicit abandonment of the normative pressure for democratization and human rights 
observance among partner-states” (2008, p. 166).  
Restrictive laws regarding the conditions of entry and residence of migrants, asylum-
seekers, and refugees, the reinforced controls of the EU external borders, and the dramatic 
expansion of the web of detention centres in and out of the EU territory illustrate the 
community of interests shared by countries of destination, transit, and origin (Webber, 
2008 p. 5).  
4.3 Implications for human rights observance 
This prioritization process might lead to the flexible and restrictive (re)interpretation of 
internationally recognized standards and norms as applied to refugee protection. To give an 
example, the UNHCR and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) have on 
various occasions denounced that the very notion of “persons in need of international 
protection” has subtly shifted from obligations to consider individual asylum claims with due 
respect to the standards enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention to considerations based 
on general contextual conditions in the third country to which asylum seekers are 
subsequently returned, once their claims have been rejected and viewed as being 
unfounded (e.g., following the application of the safe third-country concept). Obviously, 
                                                                                                                                                            
migration dialogue, the 2000 Migration Dialogue for West Africa, and the Global Forum on Migration and 
Development. 
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this shift implies that the rejection of an asylum claim does not mean or prove that the 
asylum-seeker is not in need of international protection.  
An additional concern lies in the development of “premature returns”. ECRE explains that 
returns are premature when governments in Europe tend to consider the “declared end of 
hostilities and in a given country/region” (Coelho, 2005 p. 14) as a sufficient ground to 
enforce the return of refugees or even to delay the examination of the claims of asylum-
seekers. Examples of premature returns abound. The UNHCR, ECRE and human rights 
advocacy NGOs have repeatedly voiced their concerns regarding premature returns to 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, to mention just a few cases. 
More recently, in 2009, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas 
Hammarberg called on governments in Europe “to avoid forced returns of minorities to 
Kosovo and to regulate the status of those in their host country until conditions in Kosovo 
permit their safe return”. He warned against the “negative effect” of enforced returns of 
Romas, Serbs and minority Albanians to Kosovo, given the resilient unsafe situation and 
ethnic tensions with which the latter would be faced. 
In a similar vein, the way in which the Italian-Libyan cooperation on readmission has 
developed over the last five years arguably constitutes another emblematic case of how 
internationally recognised standards can be restrictively reinterpreted.   
In April 2005, the European Parliament (EP) voted on a resolution stating that the “Italian 
authorities have failed to meet their international obligations by not ensuring that the lives 
of the people expelled by them [to Libya] are not threatened in their countries of origin.”27 
This resolution was adopted following the action of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and various human rights associations denouncing the collective expulsions of 
asylum-seekers to Libya that Italy organized between October 2004 and March 2005.  
A few years later, neither the April 2005 EP resolution, nor the intense advocacy work of 
migrant-aid associations, nor the action of the office of the UNHCR, have contributed to 
substantially reversing the trend. On the contrary, Italy has broadened and reinforced its 
bilateral cooperation with Libya in the field of readmission, raising serious concerns among 
human rights organizations and the UN institutions regarding the respect of the non-
refoulement principle enshrined in international refugee standards, on the one hand, and 
the safety of the readmitted persons to Libya, on the other. 
The reinforcement of the bilateral cooperation became perceptible in May 2009 when Italy 
set out to intercept migrants in international waters before they could reach the Italian 
coasts to subsequently force them back to Libya. Hundreds of would-be immigrants and 
asylum-seekers have been forcibly subjected to these operations. UNHCR vehemently 
reacted against these push-back operations in international waters, which engaged Italy’s 
responsibility under the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention (Council of Europe, 2010).  
In September 2009, Human Rights Watch published a detailed report (HRW, 2009) on the 
dreadful conditions and ill-treatment facing readmitted persons in Libya. Despite the ill-
treatment evidenced in the HRW report, the European Council called on the then-Swedish 
Presidency of the European Union and “the European Commission to intensify the dialogue 
                                                 
27  European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Lampedusa, April 14, 2005,  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=8B5BEAAD5A39468ECA77F272A4E6D528.node
2?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2005-0138+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
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with Libya on managing migration and responding to illegal immigration, including 
cooperation at sea, border control and readmission [while underlining] the importance of 
readmission agreements as a tool for combating illegal immigration” (European Council, 
2009b, p. 12). This intensified dialogue has become part of the geographical priorities of 
the EU external relations listed in the December 2009 Stockholm programme (European 
Council, 2009). 
 Recommendation 5: The European Parliament should ask the European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) to carry out a thorough study on the practice of 
“premature returns” and on its impact on the respect for fundamental rights and 
refugee protection standards. The study will apply to all the third countries with 
which the EU is intensifying its dialogue in the field of migration management, 
including those with which EU readmission agreements are being negotiated or have 
been concluded. 
 Recommendation 6: The European Parliament should request the Commission to 
report clearly on the type of dialogue on migration management that is to be 
intensified. The Commission should report on how the respect for fundamental rights 
and refugee standards is concretely translated in the geographical priorities of the 
EU external action.   
4.3.1 The search for operability 
The above case study shows that the need to respond to perceived threats does not only 
rest on operable means of implementation that are often antonymous to transparency and 
to the respect of international commitments. It also rests on a subtle denial. Clearly, such a 
denial does not stem from the ignorance or failure to recognize the value of international 
norms relating to migrants’ rights, asylum-seekers, and the status of refugees. Rather, it 
stems first and foremost from the prioritization of operable means of implementation. In 
this respect, the interview made by HRW with Frontex deputy executive director, Gil Arias 
Fernández, is telling:  
Based on our statistics, we are able to say that the agreements [between Libya 
and Italy] have had a positive impact. On the humanitarian level, fewer lives 
have been put at risk, due to fewer departures. But our agency [i.e., Frontex] 
does not have the ability to confirm if the right to request asylum as well as 
other human rights are being respected in Libya (Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 
37). 
The most eloquent aspect of Arias Fernández’s statement lies perhaps in the subjective 
vision that reinforced border controls save the lives of those migrants seeking better living 
conditions in destination countries. The bilateral cooperation on readmission is viewed as 
the best solution to tackle the “humanitarian” crisis, regardless of whether the country 
where migrants are to be readmitted (i.e., Libya) already possesses the capacity to fully 
respect the fundamental human rights and the dignity of the removed persons. This 
declaratory statement induces us to understand that it is because of the right to protect life 
that power is exercised and rhetorically justified by the same token. 
This subtle denial and its ensuing operable means of implementation have gradually 
contributed to diluting international norms and standards that had been viewed as being 
sound and secure (Weinzierl, 2007, Coelho, 2005). This denial is reflective of the conflicting 
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relationships between national interests and international commitments in which the 
readmission of aliens is fully embedded.28  
Perhaps, at a political level, one of the most decisive steps that has been taken so far to 
warn against the consequences of the predominant search for operability on human rights 
observance lies in the recent adoption by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE) of Resolution 1741(2010).29 Points 3 and 7.1 are noteworthy: 
– [Point 3] “There is a risk that readmission agreements pose a threat, directly or 
indirectly, to the human rights of irregular migrants or asylum seekers. This 
concerns, in particular, the risk that the sending or the readmitting country fails 
to honour their obligations under the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (the 1951 Geneva Convention) and its 1967 Protocol and the 
European Convention on Human Rights and then uses a readmission agreement 
to enforce a flawed decision.  
– [Point 7.1] The Assembly invites the European Union to “properly consider the 
human rights situation and the availability of a well-functioning asylum system 
in a country prior to entering into negotiations on readmission agreements with 
that country” [italics added]. 
At a time when the cooperation on readmission has taken on unprecedented importance in 
the external relations of the Member States and of the EU, the abovementioned PACE 
resolution on readmission may be interpreted as word of caution addressed to governments 
in Europe.  
 Recommendation 7: Given the full incorporation of the Charter in the Treaties, the 
European Parliament should call for an updated list of binding criteria that have to 
be respected to identify third countries with which new EU readmission agreements 
can be negotiated.30 The need for an effective asylum system in the third country, 
based on the obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, constitutes one key 
criterion that monitors the consequences of the drive for operability.  
Furthermore, it is no accident that a concomitant resolution was adopted by the PACE on 
assisted voluntary return (AVR) programmes. Resolution 1742(2010)31 supports the 
development of such programmes which are viewed in the resolution as a “much more 
humane type of return” (unlike enforced return) giving persons who are served a removal 
order (i.e., victims of human trafficking, rejected asylum seekers, protection seekers who 
withdrew their asylum application, unaccompanied minors and irregular migrants) “the 
possibility of returning home with dignity”.  
                                                 
28  Lena Skoglund (2008, p. 363) observed the same tension with reference to diplomatic assurances against 
torture whereby a state (e.g., a country of origin) promises that it will not torture or mistreat a removed 
person viewed as a security threat by the law-enforcement authorities of another state (e.g., a host 
country). See also Noll (2006) and Hasselberg (2009). 
29  See Council of Europe (2010a), 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1741.htm. This resolution 
followed the release of a PACE report on readmission agreements (Strik, 2010). 
30  The most recent list of criteria used to identify third countries with which readmission agreements can be 
negotiated date back to April 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002). 
31  See Council of Europe (2010), 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1742.htm  
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Today, the reference to the humane and dignified nature of assisted voluntary returns is 
recurrent if not undisputed in official discourses. The humane dimension has been 
frequently repeated to make AVR programmes a preferable option over enforced removals.  
However, there exist additional elements that have been considered by states to sustain 
the development and expansion of AVR programmes. First, experience has shown that third 
countries tend to be more cooperative on the delivery of travel documents when the 
request for laissez-passers or travel documents is formulated in the framework of AVR 
programmes.32 Second, they decrease the duration of detention of unauthorised migrants 
and consequently reduce its costs. Third, AVR programmes apply to all stages of the 
asylum application process. In other words, those who applied for asylum and are pending 
a reply, as well as those whose application has been rejected by the authorities of the 
destination country (even after an appeal has been dismissed) can be eligible for voluntary 
return. In a similar vein, persons who were granted temporary protection are also eligible. 
The latter shall withdraw or discontinue the asylum application before returning to the third 
country.  
The fact that AVR programmes address an array of potential beneficiaries (migrants, 
asylum-seekers) has drawn the attention of various EU member States. There is, however, 
no harmonized approach to voluntary return at an EU level, for each Member State has its 
own legislation supporting the implementation of such programmes with the assistance of 
various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), associations, and international 
organizations.  
For instance, in Italy, since the adoption of Law 94 dated 15 July 2009, foreigners who do 
not have a residence permit (i.e., irregular migrants) are no longer eligible for AVR 
programmes. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, such programmes encompass both 
irregular migrants and asylum-seekers.33 Poland’s AVR programme also applies to both 
rejected asylum-seekers and unauthorised migrants, following the conclusion in 2005 of an 
agreement with IOM for the Cooperation on Assisted Voluntary Return of Foreign Nationals 
Leaving Polish Territory.34  
It is important to refer to such programmes. Not only because they have gained 
momentum, but also because some EU Member States have established in the framework 
of their cooperation on readmission a link with AVR programmes. For instance, France has 
included clauses on assisted voluntary returns in its bilateral agreements on the joint 
management of migration flows, concluded with African countries. In a note dated March 
2010, the French Office for Immigration and Integration stated that unauthorised third-
country nationals in detention centres are entitled to benefit from AVR when they are 
nationals of a country which concluded this type of agreement with France. In a similar 
vein, as a result of their bilateral readmission agreement, Germany and Vietnam agreed by 
means of through exchanges of letters to promote the removal of unauthorised vitenamese 
through the implementation of an AVR programme whereby the Vietnamese authorities 
committed to becoming more cooperative on the issuance of travel documents at the 
request of Germany. 
                                                 
32  For example, Indian consular authorities are known to be more cooperative on the delivery of travel 
documents to their nationals, when the latter are returned through AVR programmes. Source:  Interview 
made with an IOM officer, 12th August 2010. 
33  There exist two main AVR programmes in the UK. Both are operated by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM): The Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP, since 1999) and the 
Assisted Voluntary Return for Irregular Migrants (AVRIM, since 2004) programme. See Poppleton and Rice, 
2009. 
34  The European Migration Network (EMN) has produced a wealth of information about the rationale for AVR 
programmes in each EU Member State. These are accessible at: http://emn.sarenet.es/html/index.html  
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AVR programmes can be viewed as flexible instruments which, among others, address the 
swift removal of unauthorised aliens, whether these are irregular or rejected asylum-
seekers.35 
Admittedly, owing to the resilient paucity of information and data allowing AVR 
programmes to be assessed, this interrelationship cannot be proven with hard evidence. 
However, it remains plausible given the overriding drive for operability and flexibility.  
The polyvalence of AVR programmes explains why they have raised serious concerns 
among associations and NGOs in Europe as well as among members of the Council of 
Europe who, in a motion for a recommendation dated 7 January 2008, called for an 
analysis of their human rights implications. (Council of Europe, 2008) This concern was 
echoed in Points 10.1 and 10.4 of the abovementioned Resolution 1742(2010). The Council 
of Europe encouraged Member States to: 
– [Point 10.1] ensure that assisted voluntary programmes are indeed voluntary, 
that their consent is not obtained under pressure or blackmail and that returnees 
have access to independent and impartial actors in the return process to make 
free and informed decisions. 
– [Point 10.4] ensure that assisted voluntary return should never put in jeopardy 
the right of an asylum seeker to claim asylum and protection. 
Apart from the questionable voluntary dimension of assisted voluntary return programmes, 
there exist additional concerns regarding 1/the safety of “voluntary returnees” in their 
countries of origin, and 2/the sustainability of their return.  
These have been evidenced over the last few years by academic institutions and research 
centres which carried out field surveys based on interviews with returned third-country 
nationals in their countries of return. The common objective of these surveys was to 
provide empirical evidence of the social economic and psychological conditions of the 
beneficiaries of AVR programmes and of readmitted persons too. Moreover, they set out to 
assess the impact of both readmission and AVR programmes on the patterns of 
reintegration of foreigners in their countries of return. In other words, they tried to fill in a 
knowledge gap which has characterised so far the implementation of policies aimed at 
removing, either coercively or on a voluntary basis, aliens who are subjected to a return 
decision by the authorities of a Member State.  
For instance, June de Bree (2008) observed in the framework of a field survey carried out 
in Afghanistan that interviewees are faced with poor employment and housing conditions 
back to their country of origin. Her field survey showed that 93% of the sample declared 
that “they are restricted in their mobility within Afghanistan, either because they or their 
family had personal issues with the Taliban or Mujahedeen, or because of a general feeling 
of insecurity due to violence, crime and (terrorist) attacks” (Bree, 2008 p. 16). Insecurity, 
added to economic and social instability in Afghanistan, are the most frequent factors that 
interviewees mentioned to leave again for abroad as 89% of them expressed the desire to 
                                                 
35  In this respect, Jon Sward underlines that “the current upsurge in AVR has taken place in a era marked by 
the increasingly rigid migration guidelines in European countries. Indeed, the spread of AVR programmes to 
transit countries with support from European governments can be seen as one dimension of efforts by EU 
countries to combat ‘upstream’ migration flows, in order to stop migrants reaching Europe in the first place. 
Other approaches in this same policy vein include the strengthening of transit country border controls, 
information campaigns to warn potential migrants in countries of origin about the dangers of 
undocumented migration to Europe, and ‘co-development’ programmes” (Sward, 2009 p. 3). 
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return to the West.36 In a similar vein, in a comparative study based on a large number of 
interviews carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Togo, 
Marieke van Houte and Mireille de Koning (2008) showed that social and political tensions 
in the country of return, added to the lack of safety, account for the interviewees’ desire to 
re-emigrate, even when obstacles to do so exist (van Houte and Koning, 2008 p. 34). 
These factors strongly jeopardise the interviewees’ possibility of reintegrating socially and 
professionally in the country of return. More incisively, Ulrike Von Lersner et al show in 
their longitudinal survey on refugees who returned on a voluntary basis from Germany to 
Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Turkey and Iraq that 58% of the interviewees “reported that their 
return was [actually] involuntary and highly influenced by government authorities, and was 
therefore seen as an alternative to forced return” (Von Lersner 2008). The authors’ study, 
based on interviews with voluntary returnees, also provides evidence of resilient 
psychological distress among the respondents, hampering their process of reintegration in 
the country of return. 
Such field investigations are important to understand how the voluntary dimension and the 
“sustainability of return”, which constitute key elements supporting the adoption and 
implementation of AVR programmes, have been addressed in concrete terms in the above 
case studies. They are also useful to show that, in most cases, “the notion of return has 
shifted from being a voluntary decision made by individuals to a policy option which is 
exercised by governments” (Blitz et al 2005, p. 196).  
Arguably, it is the aforementioned drive for operability that has supported this shift, just 
like it has so far exempted AVR programmes from any comprehensive and independent 
assessment of their impact on the conditions of persons in their countries of return. To be 
sure, this independent assessment would certainly respond to the call for evidence-based 
policy-making that is underlined in the Global Approach to Migration.37 Admittedly, field 
data collected in countries of return lend support to the argument that such programmes 
have to undergo a thorough assessment given their potential impact on returnees’ 
individual welfare and safety.   
 Recommendation 8: A comprehensive assessment of AVR programmes on the safety 
and conditions of all “voluntary returnees” in third countries of return should be 
undertaken by the European Parliament. This assessment is of paramount 
importance to lay emphasis on the extent to which AVR programmes may or may 
not have external human rights implications, after return to a third country.  
4.4 The issue of effectiveness 
Many would argue that effectiveness is about implementation or operability. Quantitative 
data on approved and refused readmission requests, number of applications submitted 
under the normal and accelerated procedures, number of travel documents (or laissez-
passers) issued to the authorities of a requesting state, and financial considerations would 
certainly constitute the most obvious indicators to assess the effectiveness of readmission 
agreements, whether these are bilateral or European. Such indicators are useful to 
calculate the extent to which two contracting parties commit to respecting their reciprocal 
                                                 
36  An evaluation report directed by Arne Strand, based on interviews with Afghan “voluntary returnees”, 
confirms their desire to re-emigrate for abroad owing to harsh insecure conditions and poor economic 
prospects in Afghanistan. See Strand et al. (2008 pp. 46-47). 
37  “Policies on migration need to be based on reliable evidence and be coherent with other related policies. 
Promoting the links between policy and research can contribute to a better understanding of migration 
realities and policy development.” See European Commission (2006, p. 6). 
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obligations. Arguably, these indicators may be taken into consideration to evaluate EU 
readmission agreements concluded with third countries as well as those that are being 
negotiated by the Commission. This evaluation process was requested in the Stockholm 
programme and requested in the European Pact on Migration and Asylum. 
Data on the number of removals exist. These were produced initially by the Centre for 
Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration 
(CIREFI)38 which, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, was abolished by 
Coreper. Its functions were transferred to Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU). Data are 
reported by Member States in the framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN).  
Member States also report their statistical data to Eurostat following the adoption of 
Regulation 862/200739 aimed at establishing common rules for the collection and 
compilation of community statistics. In the field of return, available Eurostat data for the 
years 2008 and 2009 address: 
- “the number of third-country nationals who have in fact left the territory of the 
Member State, following an administrative or judicial decision or act” (henceforth 
“third-country nationals who left”); 
- “the number of third-country nationals found to be illegally present in the territory 
of the Member State who are subject to an administrative or judicial decision or act 
stating or declaring that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the 
territory of the Member State” (henceforth “third-country nationals ordered to 
leave”); 
- the number of “third-country nationals who are refused entry at the external border 
because they do not fulfil all the entry conditions” (henceforth “third-country 
nationals refused entry”). 
The table below provides an overview of the number of third-country nationals who are 
served an order to leave the territory of each Member State, and of those who effectively 
left. A ratio would normally reflect a form of effectiveness rate as applied to removal 
orders. However, the reported data on the table must be taken with caution, for not all 
third-country nationals who left in 2008 and 2009 were served an order to leave making 
the calculation of effectiveness rates highly unrealistic.40 Nor are third-country nationals 
consistently counted, by each Member State, as persons who left as a result of “an 
administrative or judicial decision or act”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38  See Table 4 in Annex. 
39  Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community 
Statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) N. 311/76 on 
the compilation of statistics on foreign workers, OJ L199, 31 July 2007, pp. 23-29. 
40  For instance, in a correspondence with the UK Border Agency (UKBA), dated 26th July 2010, the Agency 
explained that persons refused entry on arrival at port leave the territory without an order to leave. 
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Table 3. Number of third-country nationals (TCNs) ordered to leave and third-
country nationals who left the territory of each Member State, 2008-2009. 
2008 2009   
TCNs ordered to leave TCNs who left TCNs ordered to leave TCNs 
who left 
Austria 8870 5855 10625 6410 
Belgium 32680 3965 23900 4060 
Bulgaria 1405 275 1465 285 
Cyprus 3355 3480 3205 4520 
Czech Republic 3770 585 3805 850 
Denmark : 825 : 800 
Estonia 185 95 150 115 
Finland 1775 910 3125 1720 
France 97515 19470 88565 18400 
Germany 11985 14295 14595 11900 
Greece 146335 68565 126140 62850 
Hungary 4205 1190 4850 2245 
Ireland 3510 770 1615 830 
Italy 68175 7140 53440 5315 
Latvia 265 270 70 200 
Lithuania 910 855 1210 925 
Luxembourg : : 185 105 
Malta 3015 305 1690 530 
Netherlands 31700 9350 43360 8980 
Poland 8145 8595 8520 6945 
Portugal 8185 1345 10295 1220 
Romania 3695 3820 5125 4670 
Slovakia 1655 1295 1180 900 
Slovenia 1555 1995 1065 2220 
Spain 82940 29785 103010 28865 
Sweden 12555 9015 17820 11980 
United Kingdom 69840 47455 69745 62535 
EU 27 608225 241505 598755 250375 
Source: Eurostat 
For instance, the number of those who left Germany and the United Kingdom included not 
only those who were expelled as a result of a removal order, but also those who returned 
on a voluntary basis. Conversely, those who left France included only those who were 
served a removal order but not those who returned on a voluntary basis.  
Moreover, the reported data do not provide any information regarding the impact of EU 
readmission agreements on the overall number of third-country nationals who left the EU. 
The only way of assessing their impact consists in collecting data from the authorities of the 
third countries concerned. This is what the Commission is doing, at the time of writing, by 
sending a questionnaire allowing the contribution of EU and bilateral readmission 
agreements to be comparatively assessed with reference to the difference between 
approved and refused readmission requests, the number of applications submitted under 
the normal and accelerated procedures, the number of travel documents issued to the 
authorities of a requesting Member State under an EU readmission and under a bilateral 
agreement (if any).  
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Systematic data are also necessary to address whether and the extent to which some 
readmitted persons have refunded the cost of the readmission procedures. Available 
information about this issue remains too scanty. 
As stated before, quantitative data are key to understanding how parts of the reciprocal 
obligations contained in a readmission agreement have been addressed.  
However, reciprocal obligations are not limited to such quantitative considerations. 
Reciprocal obligations also include the respect for fundamental rights of the unauthorised 
aliens enshrined, among others, in the 1951 Refugee Convention and in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
In this respect, Point 6, in the aforementioned PACE Resolution 1741(2010), states that:  
It is essential to negotiate and apply readmission agreements which take fully into 
account the human rights of the irregular migrants concerned. Furthermore, it is 
crucial, in order to better understand and evaluate these instruments, to collect 
data on their effects and implementation [italics added]. 
To date, there are no accurate data allowing such a comprehensive evaluation to be 
performed with specific reference to the cooperation on readmission and its implications on 
the fate of readmitted persons after their removal to a cooperative third country, let alone 
to another country of destination (as a result of the “domino effect” mentioned in section 
2.3.2.). 
The first reason lies in that available statistical data allow the operability to be calculated, 
not its implications in terms of human rights observance. It has to be stressed that 
readmission agreements are predominantly aimed at removing unauthorised migrants, not 
at systematically ensuring their safe reintegration in a country of return or at effectively 
dealing with return conditions.  
The second reason is that available data address law-enforcement decisions as applied to 
the readmission of unauthorised aliens but not their concrete effects. Effects, in the 
parlance of the PACE, refer to the fate of unauthorised aliens and to the extent to which 
readmission agreements, once implemented, impact on their safety and rights before and 
after their removal to a third country.  
Measurable indicators could be taken into consideration to respond to the PACE resolution, 
particularly regarding the ways in which effective right for remedy and the fair treatment of 
asylum claims has been addressed, number and conditions of asylum-seekers in detention 
centres, number and types of complaints filed by aliens against immigration and border 
officers, medical records on aliens’ physical and mental health, conditions after readmission 
in the third country. The list is far from being exhaustive. 
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 Recommendation 9: The European Parliament should call on the Commission to 
adopt an evaluation process of EU readmission agreements that fully reflects their 
manifold implications, not only in terms of operability, but also in terms of respect 
for the Union’s fundamental values. The FRA should be mobilised to identify robust 
and measurable indicators allowing the fate of readmitted persons to be evaluated.  
 Recommendation 10: The European Parliament should foresee the possibility of 
assessing a sample of bilateral readmission agreements. Given the predominance of 
a bilateral readmission system in which most EU Member States are involved, this 
initiative would shed light on the rationales, configuration and implications for 
human rights observance of bilateral patterns of cooperation on readmission.  
4.5 A public/private regulatory system 
There can be no question that the production of knowledge about readmission, as well as 
access to data, has become strategic, if not crucial, in political terms. The drive for 
operability, added to the consolidation of a security paradigm and its ensuing hierarchy of 
priorities, have obviously had a bearing on how knowledge has been produced and 
delivered. The state has been but one actor in the consolidation process of the hierarchy of 
priorities. 
Actually, in the fields of the fight against unauthorized migration, detention, and 
readmission, private business concerns and large security corporations have been 
increasingly mobilized to arguably minimize the costs (and visibility) of removal and to 
maximize its operability. In this respect, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen explains in his 
comprehensive study on the outsourcing of migration controls that:  
Today, the privatisation of migration control is far from limited to airlines or other 
transport companies. From the use of private contractors to run immigration detention 
facilities and enforce returns and the use of private search officers both at the border 
and at offshore control zones, to increasing market for short-term visa exemption 
agents, privatised migration control is both expanding and taking new forms 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2009, p. 233).  
In the European Union, the outsourcing of migration controls to private contractors in the 
security and surveillance sectors (e.g., the GEO Group, European Homecare, Group 4 
Securicor, International Trading Agency Overseas Escorts Ltd., RSI Immigration Services 
Ltd., Global Solutions Ltd., to mention just a few) has gained momentum over the last ten 
years or so as a result of an amazingly lucrative business (Hayes, 2009 p. 12). Such EU 
Member States as the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands, have 
outsourced parts of the management of their detention facilities and of their escorting for 
removal operations.  
Reasons accounting for the delegation of some regulatory functions of the state are 
diverse. In a recent study, Michael Flynn and Cecilia Cannon (2009) show that large 
security companies have penetrated national migration control and surveillance systems in 
a number of countries around the globe, whether these are countries of destination or of 
origin, not only because they are purportedly responsive to cost-effectiveness, but also 
because their involvement might incur less visibility and accountability.  
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The action of human rights organisations, associations and also the media, have allowed 
alleged assaults and ill-treatment against asylum-seekers in detention centres and against 
readmitted aliens, escorted by private security agents, to be publicly exposed, leading to 
numerous inquiries (Independent Asylum Commission 2010; Arnold et al 2008). There can 
be no question that outsourced migration controls “have important consequences not only 
for the effective enforcement of refugee and human rights law, but also for the possibilities 
of establishing legal clarity” (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2009, p. 271).  
The actual magnitude of outsourcing in the field of readmission is still unknown. However, 
it is reasonable to argue that a readmission system is emerging whereby the interests of 
the private remain intertwined with those of the public to respond and legitimize operable 
means of implementation. Incidentally, private security companies do not only deliver a 
service which, being private, often remains beyond public purview, they are also proactive 
in developing “extremely close ties” (Flynn and Cannon, 2009, p. 16) with decision-makers 
and government officials and in expanding strategic alliances with other key private actors 
or subcontractors. Clearly, further evidence is needed to understand the actual impact of 
these interconnections on policy options and priorities. There are forms of interference that 
neither affect decision-making processes and policy options, nor are they meant to do so 
substantially.  
Nonetheless, some may entail the provision of information that policy-makers value in their 
day-to-day tasks. Information provision which often takes place through special advisory 
committees also implies how policy issues and exigencies can be perceived and dealt with. 
It is reasonable to assume that the participation of private contractors’ staff in such 
committees, as evidenced by Ben Hayes (2009), may have contributed to consolidating the 
hierarchy of priorities mentioned above and its security paradigm, while making its means 
of implementation if not more practicable, at least more banal, thinkable, and acceptable.  
 
 Recommendation 11: The European Parliament should undertake a thorough 
examination of the outsourcing of migration control functions to private contractors 
in all the EU Member States. This monitoring is of paramount importance to assess 
the actual magnitude and rationale for outsourcing to private security companies as 
well as its implications for public accountability and for the observance of 
unauthorised aliens’ fundamental rights, particularly those who are offered an order 
to leave. 
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CONCLUSION 
To be sure, the cooperation on readmission as it stands now in the external relations of the 
EU involves more than an absolute duty to re-accept one’s own nationals. Since the mid 
1990s, when the Council of the European Union recommended guiding principles to the 
Member States in their bilateral negotiations with third countries on readmission, 
cooperative patterns have become highly diverse.  
This study explained how the drives for flexibility and operability have gradually led to the 
emergence of diverse cooperative patterns on readmission. It is precisely the combination 
of these factors that has been conducive to the dramatic expansion of the cobweb of 
bilateral agreements linked to readmission (whether standard or not). 
EU readmission agreements have evolved in a dominant bilateral readmission system 
including all kinds of migration countries, whether they are rich or poor, democratically 
organised or totalitarian, stable or fragile. One is entitled to question the extent to which 
the prioritisation of readmission in EU external relations is compatible with the promotion of 
good governance, democracy and public accountability in partner countries, above all 
when, as shown in this study, some partner countries can effectively capitalise on their 
empowered position.  
In a similar vein, when considering that the cooperation on readmission constitutes one of 
the many ways in which to consolidate a broader bilateral cooperative framework, including 
other strategic (and perhaps more crucial) policy areas such as security, energy, trade, and 
the fight against terrorism, one is entitled to question whether a cooperative third country 
has a vested interest in developing a genuine legal system aimed at the respect for the 
rights of migrants and the protection of asylum-seekers. Under these circumstances, it is 
reasonable to warn the European Parliament about future guarantees, aimed at ensuring 
the safety of persons readmitted to a third country that has no effective asylum system, as 
this happened in the case of the EU-Pakistan readmission agreement. Such guarantee can 
hardly be taken seriously. 
Consequently, the call of the Council of Europe to  
conclude readmission agreements only with countries that comply with 
relevant human rights standards and with the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
that have functioning asylum systems in place and that protect their 
citizens’ right to free movement, neither criminalising unauthorised entry 
into, nor departure from, the country in question41 
cannot be dismissed offhand, above all following the incorporation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union into the Treaties.  
Additionally, this study set out to raise awareness of the existence of dominant frameworks 
of understanding that have branded readmission agreements as the only technical 
instruments able “to combat illegal migration.” The need for enhanced cooperation on 
readmission has been presented as a sine qua non to tackle unauthorised migration viewed 
as a shared problem or perceived threat. There is no hard evidence that the cooperation on 
readmission has had any effect on the magnitude of unauthorised migration, making any 
                                                 
41  See Point 6.1 in Resolution 1741 (2010), see Council of Europe (2010a).  
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direct correlation highly misleading. Of course, in current official discourses, this 
unquestioned though questionable cause-and-effect relationship results from and fosters 
consensus formation. It subtly justifies, by the same token, the use of operable means that 
might weaken the enforceability of universal norms and standards on human rights without 
necessarily ignoring or denying their existence. The Italian-Libyan pattern of cooperation on 
readmission is perhaps the most emblematic case. Without the existence of an 
unquestioned scheme of understanding, based on the use of hegemonic language and 
sustained by the repetition of regional consultative processes (mobilizing state actors from 
countries of origin, of transit, and of destination), neither the asymmetric costs inherent in 
the cooperation on readmission would have become less critical in the bargaining process, 
nor would the cobweb of agreements have developed simultaneously at the global level. 
This study is an attempt to shed light on how and why the readmission system has 
materialized so far and which major forces have driven its expansion and policy options, at 
bilateral and EU levels. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European 
Parliament has acquired the legislative and political powers to have a say on the hierarchy 
of priorities that has so far sustained the expansion of the readmission system, before it 
consolidates for good. The various recommendations contained in this study constitute 
concrete steps to move forward in accordance with the fundamental rights principles that 
the Union seeks to advance in its external action. 
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Table 4: Number of returned third-country nationals from each Member State, top-10 nationalities, 2009 
 Albania Morocco Brazil Ukraine India Iraq China (including Hong Kong) Afghanistan Turkey Algeria Other Total 
Austria 90 125 15 130 235 240 190 165 250 55 4895 6390 
Belgium 135 265 1265 345 75 30 75 20 85 55 1685 4035 
Bulgaria 10 10 0 0 0 30 5 20 70 5 100 250 
Cyprus 0 10 0 50 310 10 165 5 95 0 3855 4500 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 415 0 0 10 0 10 0 405 840 
Denmark 10 10 20 20 15 125 20 25 35 10 490 780 
Estonia 0 0 0 10 0 0 5 15 0 0 70 100 
Finland 10 20 5 20 30 250 50 35 30 10 1235 1695 
France 275 2890 670 275 805 430 810 365 910 2930 8015 18375 
Germany 180 300 75 170 460 585 270 155 1040 440 8185 11860 
Greece 60040 20 5 70 35 320 15 470 375 15 1430 62795 
Hungary 70 5 0 40 5 10 25 35 105 10 1945 2250 
Ireland 5 0 200 10 5 10 20 0 5 0 565 820 
Italy 1085 830 125 355 80 30 135 5 40 170 2440 5295 
Latvia 0 0 0 20 0 0 5 5 5 0 160 195 
Lithuania 0 0 0 110 5 0 5 0 45 0 740 905 
Luxembourg  5 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 80 
Malta 0 10 0 10 20 0 10 0 5 10 465 530 
Netherlands 115 380 535 270 135 685 475 75 935 50 5340 8995 
Poland 5 10 0 4300 20 15 75 5 35 10 2445 6920 
Portugal 0 30 715 80 30 0 20 0 0 15 315 1205 
Romania 40 25 35 110 40 40 1375 0 1200 5 1785 4655 
Slovakia 5 0 0 335 10 5 10 45 10 0 470 890 
Slovenia 95 25 10 140 5 10 105 25 55 5 1715 2190 
Spain 70 10130 2225 295 165 20 245 15 245 2195 13230 28835 
Sweden 80 65 10 60 60 3180 160 135 175 85 7955 11965 
United Kingdom 845 215 5735 670 5715 2010 3350 5095 900 525 37460 62520 
EU 27 63170 15375 11655 8310 8260 8035 7630 6715 6660 6600 107460 249870 
Source: Eurostat. Returned persons refer to “third-country nationals who have in fact left the territory of the Member State, following an administrative 
or judicial decision or act”. 
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Table 5: Number of third-country nationals ordered to leave from each Member State, top-10 nationalities, 2009 
 Albania Morocco Afghanistan Iraq Algeria Brazil China (including Hong Kong) Bolivia India Pakistan Other Total 
Austria 80 220 210 150 225 25 390 0 580 140 8595 10615 
Belgium 290 3490 1515 1170 3890 660 440 10 1415 360 10640 23880 
Bulgaria 20 30 95 270 30 0 10 0 5 15 975 1450 
Cyprus 0 10 10 10 0 0 125 0 0 315 2705 3175 
Czech Republic 5 5 15 20 20 5 80 0 10 5 3605 3770 
Estonia 0 0 15 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 110 130 
Finland 15 35 125 465 25 5 70 0 45 10 2300 3095 
France 790 8795 4860 2025 9770 865 3495 205 3795 1870 52045 88515 
Germany 140 355 190 840 385 160 305 10 535 170 11500 14590 
Greece 63565 220 17830 7660 330 10 440 0 350 4855 30885 126145 
Hungary 65 15 160 35 10 10 300 0 20 30 4205 4850 
Ireland 15 5 5 15 10 200 30 5 5 20 1295 1605 
Italy 2875 9450 745 610 1335 890 3460 225 1480 800 31575 53445 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 70 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 5 1185 1210 
Luxembourg 10 5 0 0 15 15 5 0 0 0 115 165 
Malta 0 15 0 0 15 0 15 0 50 5 1585 1685 
Netherlands 210 3275 1710 4430 325 280 1630 25 520 415 30510 43330 
Poland 5 15 5 15 5 0 140 0 30 15 8235 8465 
Portugal 0 105 0 0 15 6070 285 0 455 175 3175 10280 
Romania 45 25 0 50 5 35 1390 0 45 40 3460 5095 
Slovakia 5 0 65 5 0 0 25 0 20 50 980 1150 
Slovenia 45 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 980 1045 
Spain 185 15625 95 125 5800 8400 2475 17120 1270 2815 49090 103000 
Sweden 85 70 255 5720 85 10 205 110 95 85 11065 17785 
United Kingdom 725 150 7320 2015 725 2955 3790 300 6105 4510 41150 69745 
EU-27 69175 41915 35230 25635 23020 20600 19125 18010 16840 16705 312035 598290 
Source: Eurostat. Third-country ordered to leave are persons “found to be illegally present in the territory of the Member State who are subject to an 
administrative or judicial decision or act stating or declaring that their stay is illegal and imposing an obligation to leave the territory of the Member 
State”. 
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Table 6: Third-country nationals refused entry at the external borders from each Member State, top-10 nationalities, 2009 
 Morocco Ukraine Brazil Russian Federation Georgia Belarus Croatia Turkey Serbia China 
(including Hong Kong) 
Other Total 
Austria 5 30 5 40 15 5 5 65 55 55 345 625 
Belgium 190 15 20 45 0 0 10 205 20 35 1505 2045 
Bulgaria 15 65 5 115 20 5 0 1525 280 40 925 2995 
Cyprus 5 50 5 40 15 10 0 20 15 20 470 650 
Czech Republic 0 40 0 85 5 10 5 15 5 5 195 365 
Denmark 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 30 
Estonia 0 35 0 370 0 5 0 40 0 5 435 890 
Finland 0 15 0 1095 0 15 0 25 0 15 135 1300 
France 650 45 1505 165 25 15 15 315 55 1570 9930 14290 
Germany 25 75 110 265 20 15 25 420 100 260 1660 2975 
Greece 15 75 5 110 125 5 20 230 90 100 2215 2990 
Hungary 5 3710 10 150 5 15 840 260 1730 35 925 7685 
Ireland 15 35 470 30 15 0 25 25 10 385 2515 3525 
Italy 265 60 150 85 10 5 20 155 75 135 2730 3690 
Latvia 0 30 0 290 10 75 0 25 5 5 200 640 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 20 
Lithuania 0 105 0 835 75 530 0 5 0 0 190 1740 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malta 0 5 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 105 120 
Netherlands 20 40 180 75 20 10 5 140 5 155 1830 2480 
Poland 0 12800 0 3350 5685 4205 0 35 5 10 765 26855 
Portugal 5 5 1670 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 835 2525 
Romania 45 935 0 140 5 20 5 725 260 115 2320 4570 
Slovakia 0 750 0 25 5 5 0 5 0 0 60 850 
Slovenia 0 200 20 265 0 0 3705 185 825 5 2665 7870 
Spain 377080 5 1995 90 5 0 5 25 0 135 7640 386980 
Sweden 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 20 
United Kingdom 145 320 2310 245 35 50 145 290 90 520 16300 20450 
EU-27 378485 19445 8460 7930 6095 5000 4835 4745 3625 3610 56945 499175 
Source: Eurostat. “Third-country nationals are refused entry at the external border because they do not fulfil all the entry conditions”. 
 
 
 
 
 

